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ABSTRACT
Has corporate law and its bundles of fiduciary obligations become
irrelevant? Over the last thirty years, the American public corporation
has undergone a profound metamorphosis, transforming itself from a
business with dispersed ownership to one whose ownership is highly
concentrated in the hands of sophisticated financial institutions.
Corporate law has not been immutable to these changes. Current
doctrine now accords to a shareholder vote two effects: first, the vote
satisfies a statutory mandate that shareholders approve a deal, and
second and significantly, the vote insulates the transaction and its actors
from any claim of misconduct incident to the approved transaction.
This Article takes issue with the courts and commentators who have
so elevated the impact of shareholder approval to insulate misconduct.
We develop why it is not reasonable to believe that the shareholders’
competencies extend to adjudging managerial misconduct, why that
conclusion is inconsistent with other modern corporate law
developments, and why such shareholder ratification is likely both
coerced and poorly considered. We also point out that the position of
courts and commentators who pronounce the death of corporate
fiduciary law is deeply qualified by the deep conflicts of interest
institutional investors face when voting as well as the very real threat
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that today’s ecology that supports shareholder activism is likely to
change so that the voice of the discontented shareholder will be at least
more muted in the future.
Finally, we provide empirical support that there is a very large
thumb on the scale that pushes all deals toward approval, regardless of
any allegations of wrongdoing. We observe substantial ownership
changes at target corporations, sometimes as high as 40 to 50 percent of
their stock, from long-term investors to hedge funds upon the
announcement of a deal and before the consummation of the
transaction with a shareholder vote. This change reflects the merger
arbitrageurs’ actions. We further show that this change in ownership
has a positive and statistically significant impact on the likelihood of
merger deals garnering the required shareholder approval.
We conclude that the Delaware courts need to rethink their
obsession with the shareholder vote, renounce the current doctrinal
trends that are taking them in the wrong direction, and return to their
historic role of evaluating whether directors have satisfied their
fiduciary duties in M&A transactions.
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INTRODUCTION
[T]he long-standing policy of our law has been to avoid the
uncertainties and costs of judicial second-guessing when the
disinterested stockholders have had the free and informed chance to
decide on the economic merits of a transaction for themselves. There
are sound reasons for this policy. When the real parties in interest—
the disinterested equity owners—can easily protect themselves at the
ballot box by simply voting no, the utility of a litigation-intrusive
standard of review promises more costs to stockholders in the form of
litigation rents and inhibitions on risk-taking than it promises in terms
of benefits to them. The reason for that is tied to the core rationale of
the business judgment rule, which is that judges are poorly positioned
to evaluate the wisdom of business decisions and there is little utility
to having them second-guess the determination of impartial decisionmakers with more information (in the case of directors) or an actual
economic stake in the outcome (in the case of informed, disinterested
stockholders). In circumstances, therefore, where the stockholders
have had the voluntary choice to accept or reject a transaction, the
business judgment rule standard of review is the presumptively
correct one and best facilitates wealth creation through the corporate
form.1

The above quote sets forth the most important development in
corporate law in this still very new century.2 Corwin v. KKR Financial
1. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312–14 (Del. 2015) (footnote omitted).
2. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 4 THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 23:8 (3d
ed. 2010) (noting that “great[] significance” arises from the twin contributions of allowing
shareholder approval to supplant enhanced scrutiny that normally applies in Revlon-type settings
and allowing the mandated vote used to accomplish that transaction also to constitute ratification
of the board’s conduct); 1A MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS &
FREEZEOUTS § 11.02 (2018) (calling Corwin “an important ruling”) (on file with authors);
STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON & RANDALL S. THOMAS, The Rise and Fall of Delaware’s
Takeover Standards, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES 29–43 (Steven
Davidoff Solomon & Randall Stuart Thomas eds., 2019) (reviewing the decline in Delaware
judicial scrutiny of M&A transactions, which culminated in Corwin’s broad embrace of the
cleansing effect of shareholder approval of the transaction); Iman Anabtawi, The Twilight of
Enhanced Scrutiny in Delaware M&A Jurisprudence, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 161, 192 (2019)
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Holdings LLC3 addresses allegations that the directors breached their
fiduciary duties by failing to pursue a variety of steps to seek better
merger terms.4 Without considering the substantive merits of this
claim, the Delaware Supreme Court dismissed the case solely on the
basis that the merger garnered majority shareholder support when they
voted on the transaction.5 Some, including the members of the Corwin
court, may well believe there are reasons not to be surprised by this
result; they see Corwin as the natural culmination of the corporate
governance movement that began half a century earlier.6 They can so
view Corwin as it squarely prefers governance mechanisms—in this
case the shareholder vote—and its attendant sense of accountability on
the part of managers over a costly and unpredictable resort to the
courts to address potential agency costs.7 Indeed, it is such a view of
governance over litigation that elevates the significance of Corwin, as
it marks not just a natural extension of the trajectory of the modern
corporate governance movement but likely its ultimate reach.
Moreover, the decision is by the most important court for corporate
matters—the Delaware Supreme Court—thus directly affecting the
(“Corwin has drastically limited the ability of plaintiffs to pursue post-closing fiduciary duty
claims against boards of directors in M&A transactions . . . .”); Matthew D. Cain, Jill Fisch, Steven
Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L.
REV. 603, 603–06 (2018) (naming Corwin as one of the important developments reducing the
availability of shareholder suits challenging deals); Charles R. Korsmo, Delaware’s Retreat From
Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers 30 (Mar. 3, 2019) (Working Paper) (on file with author) (arguing that
Corwin represents a dramatic development in Delaware law).
3. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).
4. Id. at 306.
5. Id. at 312–14. Our focus in this Article is the meaning, and hence relevance, of
shareholder votes in deal transactions. This necessarily implicates the soundness of Corwin’s
holding. What we develop here transcends Corwin by challenging the broader assumptions of
corporate law, such as the role of a shareholder vote in cleansing self-dealing transactions that we
will discuss later. For a close analysis of how poorly Corwin fits within corporate law and the
numerous significant questions it creates, see generally Franklin A. Gevurtz, Cracking the Corwin
Conundrum and Other Mysteries Regarding Shareholder Approval of Mergers and Acquisitions
(Sept.
19,
2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3252264
[https://perma.cc/SZN3-A73U].
6. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law:
Searching for the Optimal Balance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 871, 887
(Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019) (quoting and endorsing the
Corwin court’s description of the decision as aligned with “the long-standing principle of
Delaware law”).
7. See Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV.
263, 286–87 (2019) (noting that the shift in composition from retail to institutional ownership
renders resort to the courts to enforce corporate norms less important as institutional investors—
sophisticated, repeat players—can address substantive matters and resort to courts only for
procedural matters).
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governance of about two-thirds of all public firms8 and influencing the
corporate jurisprudence of other courts.
In this Article, we question the cleansing effect that should follow
shareholder approval. We closely examine shareholder consent within
the corporate setting and make the case that permitting a shareholder
vote to cleanse misconduct—as Corwin does—not only
misunderstands the meaning of consent but also stands many corporate
governance developments of the last fifty years on their head.
To set the stage for our analysis, we note that it is undoubtedly
true that our corporate governance system has evolved greatly over the
past fifty years. Today, the core focus of the modern corporate
governance movement is to establish within public companies a system
of independent oversight of the full-time management of the firm. In
one of the great social developments of the last half century, public
companies morphed rather quickly from having boards dominated by
corporate insiders to having a majority of the board members being
financially independent of the senior officers; now boards are
comprised almost entirely of independent directors.9 This development
coincided with the emergence of financial institutions as a potential
forceful voice for shareholder-centric views; this voice grew in force as
the equity ownership grew across public companies generally and as
ownership of large public companies became concentrated among

8. Adam O. Emmerich & Trevor S. Norwitz, For Corporate Litigation, Delaware Is Still the
First State, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS 2018, at 7, 7 (12th ed. 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3400258 [https://perma.cc/SVJ3-LQPV].
9. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007)
(describing the trend and explaining its existence in terms of the interaction between the embrace
of enhancing shareholder value as the primary goal of corporate governance and an improved
information environment so that firms were driven to improve shareholder wealth rather than
accede to wishes of their executives). This movement reflects the underlying belief that in public
companies, where ownership is not only separated from management but also where owners can
face a formidable collective action problem, boards of directors can provide the necessary
oversight of management’s stewardship but must be financially independent of management to
achieve this objective. See, e.g., 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3A.01(a) & cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] (recommending that at least a majority of the board of large public
companies not have a significant relationship with senior managers); MELVIN A. EISENBERG,
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS § 11 (1976) (describing the
importance of the monitoring role of directors and how that role requires financial independence
of a critical mass of board members).
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financial institutions.10 Institutional influence has been greatly
enhanced by multiple developments that enable them to coordinate
their focus: regulatory dispensations so that their public statements
regarding their views are no longer a regulated utterance;11 the
evolution of the proxy advisory industry;12 and the rise of activist
investors who regularly tee up proposals for institutions to express
their support for actions that increase shareholder value.13
Despite these changes, institutional investors sometimes feel that
boards—although technically independent of management—are
nonetheless not sufficiently shareholder focused. One important
reason for this is that regulatory definitions of independence produced
by the corporate governance movement are nonetheless porous.14 In

10. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of
Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 89, 91–93 (2017) (collecting data on the concentration
of institutional ownership among very large firms); Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim,
Institutional Investors and Stock Market Liquidity: Trends and Relationships 4–5 (Aug. 21, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2147757 [https://perma.cc/KE39-9G39]
(citing literature on the increasing share of equity ownership among financial institutions and
confirming the existence of this trend).
11. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No.
31,326, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,031, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (Oct. 22, 1992)
(codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) (liberalizing the announcements that will not be
deemed a “proxy solicitation,” such as public announcements by shareholders about how they
will vote on a matter before the stockholders and offering a voting recommendation by someone,
for example, a proxy advisor, who does not solicit proxies); see also Jill A. Hornstein, Note, Proxy
Solicitation Redefined: The SEC Takes an Incremental Step Toward Effective Corporate
Governance, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1129 (1993) (providing close analysis of the scope of the 1992
amendments to the proxy rules against cases and regulatory provisions that prevailed before the
adoption of the reforms).
12. Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting in an
Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1397 (2014).
13. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013)
(making the case that activist investors are governance intermediaries because they formulate
convincing business strategies that institutional shareholders are “rationally reticent” to initiate).
14. Just as case law fails to reach social and psychological forces that erode a director’s ability
to evaluate a fellow director or the firm’s CEO critically, see, e.g., Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040,
1051 (Del. 2004) (holding that a director is independent to judge claims against a company’s CEO
even though the director has had long-standing, extensive social involvement with the CEO),
standard regulatory provisions defining independence focus on financial dependence and not a
range of social and psychological connections that can compromise a director’s judgment, see, e.g.,
NYSE Euronext, Inc., NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.02 (2013) (listing financial,
commercial, and familial considerations that can render one not independent but not listing any
social considerations). More generally, the collegiality of the board necessarily allows social and
psychological forces to invite board members to tilt toward management. See generally James D.
Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal
Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985) (analyzing social-
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this regard, one significant corporate governance development has
been majority-vote bylaws that condition a director serving her newly
won term on that director garnering at least a majority of the votes
cast.15 Even this development can be seen as not nearly as empowering
to shareholders as their power to nominate individuals to stand for
election. Hence, the most recent success of institutional investors is the
increasing acceptance by corporations of processes empowering
shareholders to nominate some of the director candidates for
election.16 Equally significant is that the well-received practice today is
for directors to be elected annually so that they are more accountable
to shareholders, hence the cascade of shareholder votes the last few
years declassifying boards by amending their articles of incorporation
or bylaws.17 These developments all have a unifying focus: installing
individuals on the board of directors who are more independent of
management and more aligned with shareholder interests.
The social changes making up this corporate governance
movement were reflected in judicial holdings as well, most prominently
in Delaware. In what might be considered the Golden Age of corporate

psychological mechanisms among independent directors that generate biases protecting fellow
board members against legal sanctions).
15. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1010–11 (2010)
[hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs] (describing the rapid rise of majority-vote
provisions among large public companies).
16. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Director Nominations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 117, 127–32,
136–55 (2014) (concluding that the right to nominate directors arises from the statutory power of
shareholders to raise proper business at the annual meeting of shareholders and hence can only
narrowly be circumscribed by the articles of incorporation or bylaws); Robert C. Pozen,
Institutional Perspective on Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors, 59 BUS. LAW. 95,
96–99 (2003) (proposing that the SEC employ a cost-benefit framework commonly utilized by
institutional investors to evaluate proposed rule changes increasing shareholder participation in
the nomination of directors).
17. In 2008, only 16 percent of S&P 100 Companies had a staggered board, whereas in 2003,
44 percent of them had staggered boards. Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 15, at
1007–09. As the table below reflects, among the largest companies, a classified board is the
exception and not the rule.
Board elections

S&P 500

S&P MidCap
400

S&P SmallCap
600

S&P
1500

Russell
3000

Annual elections

88%

65%

58%

70%

61%

Majority voting in
director elections

89%

63%

49%

67%

52%

ERNST & YOUNG CTR. FOR BD. MATTERS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BY THE NUMBERS
(2019), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_us/topics/cbm/ey-cgbtn-monthlyjune-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAT5-HJ84] (statistics current as of June 2019).

COX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/21/2019 4:50 PM

510

[Vol. 69:503

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

law, Delaware not only resuscitated the directors’ duty of care18 but
also established templates by which control could be defended19 and
sold.20 Delaware further held directors act in bad faith if they have a
“sustained or systematic failure” to maintain legal compliance
systems.21 Massive self-dealing transactions such as going-private
transactions and incestuous controlling-shareholder-initiated mergers
were also subject to a newly minted entire fairness inquiry that includes
consideration of not just price but directorial process.22
The linchpin of these developments is those courts’ wholesale buyin to the important monitoring role of outside directors—the core
feature of the governance movement. Simply put, the quest for
directors independent of managers is not an end in itself. It is the
correlative obligations for individual directors to advance shareholder
interests that is the objective of the movement. Delaware courts
stepped forward, as did other courts, in marrying fiduciary duties to the
widely received monitoring model.
Those who think of Corwin as a natural analog to the above
discussion argue that the corporate governance movement is a social
force driven by a belief that shareholder interests and protection are
best served by an independent and well-informed monitor. From this
perspective, Corwin takes the expedient course and eliminates the
intermediary—the independent board of directors—and in its place
rests protection on the palpable force of shareholder self-interest: the
majority approval by the owners to a transaction allegedly tainted by
fiduciary wrongdoing is the ultimate arbiter of what is in the
shareholders’ best interest. Therefore, like so many other areas of

18. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873–74 (Del. 1985) (establishing that directors
exercising informed business judgments is within the duty of care and that the directors acted with
gross negligence by hurriedly approving the sale of the company at approximately a 50 percent
premium over its publicly traded market price).
19. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955–56 (Del. 1985) (setting forth
a two-part test directors must meet when engaging in defensive maneuvers).
20. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(requiring the board to take affirmative steps toward obtaining the best price for the firm when
control will be transferred).
21. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970–71 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(embracing within the director’s monitoring role the duty to have reasonably designed
information and reporting systems to assure compliance with the law as well as performance of
the company).
22. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711, 715 (Del. 1983) (substituting an
obligation of a controlling person to establish fair price and fair dealing for the formerly used
business purpose inquiry).
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corporate law, the ultimate rule is the one of majoritarianism whereby
the will of a majority of the voting owners carries the day.
We believe that a shareholder vote, such as that which is
celebrated in Corwin, is misunderstood and that according it with
insulating misconduct surrounding the approved transaction not only
misinterprets the import of the vote but also distorts the corporate
governance developments reviewed above. As such, the emphasis on a
shareholder vote unduly insulates from judicial review director and
officer failures to act as trustworthy stewards in the sale of their
company.
One factor that looms large in our thinking is the overwhelming
frequency with which shareholders are relied upon to approve
complex—and often conflicted—transactions. If shareholder approval
of the deal is the first—and, per Corwin, the only—line of defense to
managerial misconduct in connection with M&A transactions, we
would expect that activist investors would be regularly turning down
bad deals. In fact, the record of shareholder voting on such matters is
at best ponderous. Empirically, shareholders rarely vote down
mergers. We can illustrate this point using data from Professor Morgan
Ricks’s database on mergers and acquisitions.23 His data cover all
mergers and acquisitions involving U.S. public company targets
undertaken after January 1, 1996, and concluded by March 31, 2017.
The minimum-size deals included in the database is $1 billion, and
there are a total of 1,620 deals included in it. In all, only five deals were
rejected by shareholders in a formal vote. In other words, a total of 0.3
percent of all mergers have a failed shareholder vote. An additional
seventeen deals were withdrawn before completion, some of which
may have been withdrawn because of an anticipated negative
shareholder vote. If all twenty-two transactions are counted as
shareholder-rejected deals—which is certainly an overestimate—then
only 1.3 percent of large mergers fail from lack of shareholder
approval.24

23. We thank Professor Ricks for sharing this data.
24. Others have also found that M&A transactions rarely are disapproved by their
shareholders. See Matteo Gatti, Reconsidering the Merger Process: Approval Patterns, Timeline,
and Shareholders’ Role, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 850–54 (2018) (finding in a study of arms-length
mergers involving Russell 3000 firms in 2006–2015 that slightly more than 1 percent failed to
obtain shareholder approval); John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Blake Rohrbacher, Paying for the
Privilege of Independence: Termination Fees Triggered by “Naked No Votes,” INSIGHTS: CORP. &
SEC. L. ADVISOR, Sept. 2007, at 1, 2 (observing that shareholders rejected only eight out of more
than one thousand M&A transactions from 2003–2007).
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Other data sets yield the same result. For example, from a universe
of fifty going-private transactions instigated by controlling
shareholders between 2010 and 2017, Professor Ed Rock isolated
seventeen in which the transaction was conditioned on approval by a
majority of the minority holders. In none of those transactions did the
minority shareholders reject the transaction.25 Moreover, in his analysis
of some of the going-private transactions that involved the agitation
against the transaction by an activist hedge fund, Professor Rock noted
that all of them ultimately resulted in the activist investors accepting
the deal.26 He explained this as reflecting that activists had no better
means to exit from the target company than the one provided by the
controlling stockholder.27
Finally, there is strong empirical evidence that indicates
“management wins all of the close” votes in situations where the board
of directors is submitting management proposals for shareholder
approval.28 Professor Listokin’s study “examines votes on
management-sponsored resolutions and finds widespread irregularities
in the distribution of votes received by management.”29 He further
notes: “Management is overwhelmingly more likely to win votes by a
small margin than lose by a small margin. The results indicate that, at
some point in the voting process, management obtains highly accurate
information about the likely voting outcome and, based on that
information, acts to influence the vote.”30 Though Listokin’s data
largely involve management-sponsored proposals related to stock
options or bonus plans, they do include merger-approval votes that are
required by statute.31 His findings support the argument that managers
have a huge advantage in obtaining approval of closely contested
merger votes.
The above record of the low percentage of shareholder “NO”
votes is equally supportive of two distinct but opposing propositions:
(1) the shareholder vote means nothing as they blindly support the deal

25. Edward B. Rock, Majority of the Minority Approval in a World of Active Shareholders,
in THE LAW AND FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 105, 115–17 (Luca Enriques &
Tobias H. Tröger eds., 2019).
26. Id. at 121, 124, 127.
27. Id. at 129–31.
28. Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 159,
172–75 (2008).
29. Id. at 159.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 169–70 & 169 tbl.1.
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or, if not blind, will prefer the sparrow in the hand over the pheasant
in the bush; or (2) all deals are great deals because the prospect of a
vote by the shareholders chastens managers and self-dealing directors
to think twice before they submit a suboptimal deal for shareholder
approval. In this Article, we put forth empirical evidence and close
reasoning to support the first proposition. For instance, as we develop
in Part V, after the announcement of a merger agreement, there is a
substantial shift of stock into the hands of merger arbitrageurs who are
committed to the deal’s success and who will invariably vote in its
favor. This has a significant effect on the odds of a merger closing,
raising the likelihood of deal completion to near certainty in many
cases.
We begin by developing several arguments, not considered by
Corwin and its supporters, regarding why we do not believe that
obtaining the statutorily mandated stockholder approval for a
transaction is dispositive of whether actionable misconduct on the part
of its participants has occurred; simply stated, and as developed below,
these are two very different matters that need to be separated. In Part
I, we review the well-received views on the relative competencies of
shareholders in public corporations to engage in collective decisionmaking. Our conclusion is that the qualities that equip shareholders to
be competent investors in securities are not the same qualities needed
to assess whether managers have misbehaved.
In Part II, we challenge a key assumption of Corwin that today’s
environment of shareholder activism, and particularly the forces that
have nurtured it over the past twenty years, will continue in the future
to be a check on managerial opportunism and slack. In fact, the ecology
of shareholder voting in its current coordinated form is under attack
and faces strong countervailing forces. Moreover, those championing
the cleansing effect of the shareholder voice because of the growing
ownership interest of financial institutions must consider that most
financial institutions themselves face substantial conflicts of interest
that can impact their dispassionate assessment of a matter submitted
for shareholder approval. Their conflicts and the compromise they
entail in rejecting weak, or even bad, M&A deals are examined in Part
III.
Part IV addresses a central concern with any approving vote by
the stockholders, namely whether shareholders face a distorted choice
so that their will is hardly free, even if informed, and even if they
possessed the competencies needed to evaluate all the issues
surrounding the transaction that they are asked to approve. In a vote
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on the proposal to approve the merger that is bundled with approving
managerial misconduct committed in the merger process, shareholders
have a binary choice of accepting or rejecting the deal. As one
commentator put it, “[t]his means that the shareholders’ choice
ultimately comes down to asking whether the deal before them is better
[than] no deal at all.”32 Thus, we develop reasons why the vote
absolving managerial misconduct should not be bundled with the vote
required for the transaction to occur.
In Part V, we present our empirical analysis of how share
ownership among financial institutions shifts materially to short-term
investors—largely hedge funds—from medium- and long-term
institutional holders. These hedge funds have no interest in litigating
corporate management’s conduct during the sale process. Instead, they
inevitably vote to approve the deal so that they can capture the spread
between the deal price and the price at the time of the first
announcement of the proposed transaction. We show that this shift
places a “thumb on the scale”—in some instances a determinative
thumb—in favor of shareholder approval of the transaction.
In Part VI, we examine the role of shareholder votes in selfdealing transactions, a matter excluded, at least presently, by Corwin.33
The presence of self-dealing behavior does not change the conclusions
drawn from our data and analysis in Parts I–V; however, when the selfdealing falls within the narrow scope of state conflict-of-interest
statutes where shareholder approval is viewed as an alternative the
legislature has set forth to address a self-dealing transaction, it is not
possible to discard the import of that vote. Nonetheless, as we develop
in Part VI, our Article’s qualifications to the appropriate meaning of
such a vote greatly tempers the ultimate force to be given shareholder

32. Gevurtz, supra note 5, at 32; see also Korsmo, supra note 2, at 7 (“Fundamentally, a
merger vote is typically a Hobson’s choice—approve the merger as is or reject it altogether—
rather than anything resembling a traditional ratification.”).
33. Also, our focus in this Article is distinct from the authority provided in corporate statutes
for shareholders to ratify lawful acts that nonetheless, when undertaken, were not authorized due
to failing to comply with a provision of the applicable corporate statute, a corporation’s articles
of incorporation or bylaws, or corporate resolution or agreement. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, §§ 204–05 (2018); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 1.45–.52 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). Such provisions
provide governance mechanisms, either through approval by the board of directors or
shareholders, followed by a filing with the state administrator, whereby a prior unauthorized act,
such as issuance of shares that were beyond the number authorized by the articles of
incorporation, can be retroactively validated. Such statutory provisions do not validate breaches
of fiduciary duty that might accompany corporate transactions of the type that are the focus of
this Article.
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approval of self-dealing transactions. Our suggestions regarding what
to make of shareholder ratification are set forth in our concluding
section.
I. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE CONSIDERATIONS
Corporations are not democratic institutions. In a democracy,
power flows from the voting populace, and it is this body that is then
governed. The populace governs the procedures for selecting
candidates for office so that continued service as its elected
representative depends heavily on popular support to be the nominee
in the election. This is not the case with the corporation. By statute,
power over corporate affairs is lodged in the corporation’s
“governor”—the board of directors.34 Importantly, the source of the
board’s power and its legitimacy is derived from the statute and not the
shareholders. In addition, the power is exercised over interested
parties, such as nonvoting security holders and labor, who do not vote
in the election of directors. Indeed, the spheres within which
shareholders have authority are limited in number and deeply
circumscribed.35 Like children, shareholders are visible but, per
governing statutes, are rarely consulted. Their largest power is their
right to turn their elected representatives out of office. But this occurs
rarely because of formidable institutional friction. Moreover,
shareholder authority to vote for directors is deeply qualified by the
fact that they seldom have the authority to nominate directors, and
even when this rare power exists, it customarily only permits

34. See, e.g., tit. 8, § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 701
(McKinney 2019) (“[T]he business of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of its
board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(a) (“[A]ll corporate powers shall be
exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors, and the business and affairs of the
corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of the board
of directors.”). Each of these are default provisions that can be changed—but rarely are—by a
provision included in the firm’s articles of incorporation, and each are subject to discrete
provisions set forth in the governing corporate statute that conditions a limited number of
transactions, discussed later in this Section, to concurrence by shareholders thereby entitled to
vote.
35. For a review of the history of stockholders being relegated to having a vote on so-called
fundamental or organic changes as more power over corporate matters was delegated to the board
of directors, see, for example, Lynne L. Dallas, The Control and Conflict of Interest Voting
Systems, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1, 18–28 (1992) (reasoning that shareholder approval is not required for
many decisions that rival the importance of mergers or amendments of the articles of
incorporation that do require shareholder approval).
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shareholders to nominate a distinct minority of the board.36 Even in
instances where a corporation has installed majority-vote requirements
as a condition for directors continuing to serve, the only true political
voice for shareholders is a negative one.37 To be sure, stockholder
approval is required for so-called fundamental transactions, such as
mergers and the sale of substantially all of the company’s assets.
However, these transactions must be initiated by the board of
directors, which controls their timing as well as the information upon
which shareholders rely in deciding whether to approve the matter.38
Each of these features of the process result in the board being the more
powerful of the two approving groups.39
Other areas of the shareholder franchise are also deeply qualified.
The power to sell shares is qualified by the ubiquity of poison pills that
constrict takeovers and, accordingly, constrict the opportunities for
shareholders to dispose of their shares.40 Shareholder information
rights are also conditioned on, among other considerations,
demonstration of a proper purpose for the demand. And when the
request is directed toward learning of corporate wrongdoing, this
standard is further qualified on allegations of a “credible basis” for

36. See, e.g., SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, PROXY ACCESS: DEVELOPMENTS IN MARKET
PRACTICES 2 (2016), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Proxy_
Access__Developments_in_Market_Practice.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3RN-6YAH] (reporting
that 87 percent of bylaws adopted by two hundred companies in the 2015–16 proxy season limit
the number of directors that can be nominated to 20 percent of the board and that 71 percent of
those stated the limit was two directors); see also Hamermesh, supra note 16, at 136–56 (setting
forth other limitations that accompany shareholder nominations such as advance notice and
background information). See generally Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 15, at 1019–
22 (describing the history of SEC proposals for rules and limitations on proxy access, including
only nominating a minority slate).
37. See sources cited supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., tit. 8, §§ 251(b), 271(a) (setting forth requirements for a merger or sale of all or
substantially all the assets in which stockholder approval of the transaction is required but the
shareholder vote only occurs after approval by the board of directors). Under Delaware law,
companies also have substantial freedom to manipulate the form of an acquisition to avoid
holding a shareholder vote. Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 124–25 (Del. 1963)
(rejecting the de facto merger doctrine).
39. See James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L.
REV. 257, 270–71 (2015) (noting that before the courts, proposals of the board and those by the
shareholders do not stand on the same footing, at least in Delaware, where courts demonstrate
more skepticism regarding consequences attached to shareholder initiatives than those by the
board).
40. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 129 (Del. Ch. 2011) (upholding
the use of a poison pill to prevent shareholders from tendering shares while recognizing the pill’s
potential to be abused).
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believing wrongdoing has occurred.41 The final shareholder right is to
sue, where, in the case of derivative suits, the shareholder must address
the large hurdle posed by the demand requirement.42 Further, the
shareholder may find that the suit is inconveniently lodged in Delaware
or another forum favored by the company via a forum-selection
bylaw.43 In light of such serious limitations on the shareholder
franchise, Corwin’s embrace of not just the virtues but also the
paramount force of shareholder approval is at best quaint and most
likely seriously misplaced.
There are very good reasons why the shareholder franchise is both
limited in scope and deeply qualified. The genius of business
organizations is their efficiency, which in large measure flows from
enabling individuals with very different skills, experiences, and other
endowments to combine with resulting synergies. Business
organization law facilitates specialization and, in doing so,
accommodates the unique limitations of owners whose personal
endowment and circumstances justify their status as owners but not
managers of the enterprise. Thus, the dentist with a successful practice
will enjoy disposable income that she may profitably invest, but time,
skills, and experience justify the dentist having only a passive role in a
business organization, as her endowments likely better qualify her for
the profession of dentistry than that of being a captain of industry. For

41. James D. Cox, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, The Paradox of Delaware’s
“Tools at Hand” Doctrine: An Empirical Investigation 10 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 19-10, 2019) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Seinfeld v.
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 118, 123 (Del. 2006)), https://bit.ly/36KI7gl
[https://perma.cc/K8DQ-U76J]; see Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 123 (reaffirming that access to company
books and records so as to determine if misconduct has occurred will be provided if there is a
credible showing by “documents, logic, testimony or otherwise” that wrongdoing has occurred).
However, in some states access is limited to minutes of board or shareholder meetings and does
not extend to general corporate records. See, e.g., Feuer v. Merck & Co., 187 A.3d 873, 878–81
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018) (holding that seeking internal communications among directors
bearing on derivative suit demand was outside the scope of documents expressly authorized by
statute).
42. There are many permutations to the demand requirement, but regardless of the
particular approach, the plaintiff invariably faces a perilous gauntlet to traverse to file a derivative
suit. See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE
§§ 5:7, :11 (2018) (examining various approaches taken by courts to excuse plaintiffs in a
derivative suit from making a demand on the board of directors as a precondition to initiating the
derivative suit). For further information on the demand requirement and the use of special
litigation committees in place of the full board, see 3 COX & HAZEN, supra note 2, §§ 15.7–.8.
43. There is now statutory authorization for forum-selection bylaws after being upheld in
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). See tit. 8, § 115;
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.08 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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example, business decisions in the extraction of minerals likely are light
years away from the skill and experience of the extracting dentist.
Moreover, many decisions with respect to engaging in that business
must be made more quickly than could feasibly be carried out within
even an organization with a modest number of similarly situated
owners. Business organization law allows, through either a statute or
private ordering, centralization of business decisions in a group that by
composition and organization do not face similar time, skill, or
experience constraints.
At the opposite end of the decision-type spectrum are transactions
that entail an evaluation of the enterprise and, unlike ordinary business
decisions, are not seriously time bound. These transactions require
investment skills and experience of the type that we can conclude such
owners possess by virtue of their having become an owner in a business
organization.44 Examples of such transactions are amendment of the
rights, privileges, or preferences enjoyed by owners, the sale of the
firm, its acquisition of another firm of at least equal size, and the firm’s
dissolution. Within the corporate realm, these so-called fundamental
transactions must be approved by the firm’s stockholders.
Shareholder concurrence for fundamental transactions is justified
on twin bases. First, the shareholders have the skill and experience to
make such investment-like decisions, as consideration of each type of
fundamental transaction elicits heuristics not different from the skills
and experience owners are believed to possess and employ when they
made their initial investment in the firm. Second, these decisions are
not so time bound that the transaction would be jeopardized by the
convention of a very large body of owners. In the area of acquisitions,
there is a third justification for shareholder voting, namely, that
management may be deeply self-interested in the transaction so that
the shareholder vote might be a useful prophylaxis.45

44. For a development of why some decisions involve the board of directors or officers and
others also include shareholders, see EISENBERG, supra note 9, at 12–17, 68. For a fuller
development, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in
Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 7–15 (1969) [hereinafter Eisenberg, The
Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management].
45. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management, supra note 44, at 27–32.
For a fuller discussion of the justifications and limitations of shareholder voting, see generally
Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1368–69, 1377–84. The factors developed by Eisenberg are
reasons why the endowments of shareholders are believed sufficient to permit participation in
decision-making, at some level, in transactions meeting the factors. This understanding of
Eisenberg’s analysis addresses concern expressed in RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK,
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 633–34 (2d ed. 1995), that shareholders
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At the same time, some smaller body must be involved in
negotiations and resulting refinements for the transaction. To that end,
corporate law requires that fundamental transactions are first
approved by the firm’s board of directors. Note that central to the
corporate structure is not just the time dimension but more importantly
relative institutional competence. Remote owners face institutional
limitations that restrict their approval to transactions that require the
same skill and experience that they employed when they became
owners in the first instance.
We have genuine concerns, anchored in institutional competence,
with the view that the basis for believing shareholders possess qualities
that justify their right to approve fundamental corporate changes also
support the view that their approving voice should enjoy the same level
of deference when that vote is considered as also approving misconduct
that may have occurred in connection with that transaction. That is, the
reasons developed above that underlie shareholder participation being
mandated for certain structural transactions are not present when the
matter before the shareholders is whether to excuse alleged managerial
misconduct.
Our fundamental concern is that when shareholders are asked to
approve whether to pursue a claim of misconduct, this entails a very
different type of decision than the decision to approve a fundamental
transaction where corporate law justifies shareholder action. In
describing the characteristics of decisions that can include shareholder
approval, Professor Melvin Eisenberg lists matters involving general
enterprise-evaluation skills; matters whose magnitude, risks, and time
span effect make the matter significant; matters that occur
infrequently; and matters that need not be decided quickly.46 A charge
of managerial misconduct in connection with a matter that requires
shareholder approval does not appear to us to meet any of these four
considerations.
Delaware’s own initiative in 1969 to strip any reference to a
demand on shareholders from its provision dealing with procedures for

cannot be expected to be intensely involved in the many features of a complex transaction, and
therefore that they are not appropriate decisionmakers. Corporate law can be seen as embracing
Eisenberg’s reasoning while addressing Professors Gilson and Black’s concern by conditioning
that in acquisitions and other fundamental corporate events, shareholder involvement is not
greater than approving or disapproving the transaction formulated initially by the board of
directors.
46. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management, supra note 44, at 10–11.
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initiating a derivative suit support our thinking on this.47 Through the
first half of the last century, a precondition to maintaining a derivative
suit was that the plaintiff had to either make a demand on the
company’s shareholders or set forth in the complaint certain wellreceived bases for why making such a request would be futile.48 The
most prevalent bases for alleging futility was that the conduct
challenged in the complaint could not be ratified by a mere majority
vote of the shareholders.49 Generally, a demand on the shareholders
was excused when the complaint focused on acts that were fraudulent,
illegal, or ultra vires and on allegations that the public nature of the
corporation made the demand not practicable.50 During the second half
of the century, such a demand on the shareholders became nearly
nonexistent, falling prey to an ever-expanding range of grounds the
courts accepted as rendering the requirement futile.51
Over the past few decades, law reform efforts, such as the
influential American Bar Association Model Business Corporation
Act and the American Law Institute Principles of Corporate
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, rejected requiring a
demand on shareholders.52 A central basis for abandoning the
requirement is various institutional competence considerations. For all
but the private company, the stockholder meeting itself is a highly
stylized, nondeliberative event marked by very low attendance relative
to the ownership base.53 In the public company, the true meeting is a
virtual meeting that occurs within the electronic solicitation and
execution of proxies. Whether shareholders participate by proxy or
physically attend the meeting, neither medium is conducive to their
undertaking a penetrating engagement of the facts by examining
47. See DEMOTT, supra note 42, § 5:6.
48. Id. §§ 5:2, :3 (noting that even in the states where the requirement has not been
abandoned, “[f]ew recent cases ultimately require demand on shareholders”).
49. The leading case is Mayer v. Adams, 141 A.2d 458 (Del. 1958).
50. See DEMOTT, supra note 42, § 5:4 (discussing the “practical realities of shareholder
decisionmaking”); id. § 5:6 (explaining when alleged wrongs are nonratifiable by a majority vote
among shareholders); 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.03
Reporter’s Note 8 (naming practical concerns and nonratifiable conduct as among the reasons
modern decisions excuse demand on shareholders).
51. See 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.03 cmt. h. (reviewing
an extensive list of bases developed by the courts to excuse a demand on the shareholders).
52. Id. § 7.03(c) (“Demand on shareholders should not be required.”).
53. See DEMOTT, supra note 42, § 5:4 (responding to common justifications for a demand on
the shareholders and observing that “[t]he central difficulty with these arguments is that they
ignore the practical realities of shareholder decisionmaking in all but the very smallest
corporations”).
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documents, raising questions, or participating in an interchange with
other shareholders let alone discussing the facts under applicable law.
Moreover, any material revelation that occurs at the meeting would
come too late to affect the vast number of proxies earlier cast by a
nonattending shareholder. Furthermore, the dominant role of the
proxy statement in the shareholder engagement is itself unsettling
because the relevant disclosures are so dependent on information
prepared at the direction of likely self-interested directors or their
designatees. Thus, the American Law Institute (“ALI”), in rejecting a
demand on the shareholders as a precondition to initiating a derivative
suit, concluded:
As a general rule, informed collective shareholder consideration of
proposed litigation is not feasible. As a body, the shareholders cannot
realistically discuss or evaluate the often complex factual and legal
issues raised by derivative actions . . . .54

In a case considering whether a demand on the shareholders was
required in a suit alleging fraudulent behavior, the Delaware Supreme
Court was similarly dismissive of shareholder approval of such matters:
[W]e think it clear that in the ordinary case the stockholders in
meeting could not satisfactorily determine the probable merits of a
minority stockholder’s suit without a reasonably complete
presentation and consideration of evidentiary facts. . . . A
stockholders’ meeting is not an appropriate forum for such a
proceeding.55

54. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.03 cmt. h. Even though
the ALI eliminated a presuit demand requirement on the shareholders, it did not totally remove
shareholders’ consent. Section 7.11 calls for a court to dismiss a derivative suit based on the
shareholders’ approval of a resolution, passed by a disinterested board, in reliance on a thorough
and independently prepared report, that dismissal is appropriate, and on the disclosure to the
shareholders “of all material facts” regarding the action. The derivative-suit plaintiff is also
provided an opportunity to make a brief statement of the plaintiff’s views of the action and the
pending proposal for dismissal. Id. § 7.11 (excluding actions that constitute a waste of company
assets). The ALI observes:
Although it may be argued that shareholders are too disorganized or are too remote
from the events to reach an informed decision with respect to a technical issue such as
the merits of a pending action, the requirement . . . of ratification by disinterested
shareholders plus the waste limitation . . . helps to alleviate this problem. Recognition
must also be given to the fact that the shareholders are the owners of the corporation,
and as such cannot be excluded from a significant voice in deciding matters affecting
them.
Id. § 7.11 cmt. c (emphasis added). The comments further observe that such shareholder approval
would be most likely relevant in close corporations. Id. § 7.11 cmt. d.
55. Mayer v. Adams, 141 A.2d 458, 461 (Del. 1958).
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In short, just as a shareholder vote lacks efficacy as a screening device
for derivative suits, we believe that the shareholder vote approving a
deal should lack any cleansing effect because of institutional
competency considerations and because the shareholder forum is illsuited for addressing whether misconduct occurred.
The institutional investors’ use of third-party voting advisors, such
as Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) and Glass Lewis, to assist
them in their voting decisions does not alter this conclusion. These
voting advisors are not experts on Delaware law, nor do they have
access to the internal information that experienced trial lawyers are
likely to have in a full-blown litigation over a breach of the directors’
fiduciary duties. Proxy-voting advisors are primarily concerned with
assessing whether the proposed merger is superior to no transaction at
all for their clients. They do not discuss the preannouncement conduct
of the target firm’s directors in their recommendations to institutional
investors.
Ours is a minority position. The effusive support from
contemporary judicial decisions and commentators for the efficacy of
shareholder power is an understandable response to the growing
concentration of share ownership among institutional investors. The
rise and dominance of the institutional investors in capital markets and,
more importantly, in ownership of public companies feeds the
mechanisms by which corporate developments are efficiently priced
and reflected in securities prices, erodes the number of shareholders
who are rationally apathetic, and greatly ameliorates concerns about
the collective action problem. In combination, the shareholder voice
today can be—and is—more frequently heard in the boardroom than
at any time in the history of corporate law. In such an environment, it
is reasoned that the protective oversight provided by courts is
unnecessary:
[C]orporate law is no longer vital to the regulation of U.S.
corporations. The transformation of American equity markets from
retail to institutional ownership has relocated control over
corporations from courts to markets and has led to the death of
corporate law.56

56. Goshen & Hannes, supra note 7, at 265 (footnote omitted).
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The belief supporting this thesis is that “the more competent
shareholders become, the less important corporate law will be.”57 This
view reflects the increasing frequency of activist shareholders and their
concomitant success in pressing headline-grabbing changes with
respect to a range of corporate governance items.58
We believe, however, that corporate law, much as Mark Twain
famously denounced his demise as premature, can rightly claim it has
not become superfluous in the era of institutionalized markets. To be
sure, we are impressed how in just a few years’ time institutional
investors have enforced new norms of operation on public companies.
Institutional voices have made classified boards of directors the
exception and not the rule among large public companies, have led to
majority-vote provisions being the norm, have started a trend among
large companies for mechanisms to nominate directors, and have
turned the poison pill into a vanishing, albeit not extinct, species.59
But while some commentators have pointed to these
developments as a basis for corporate law becoming irrelevant,60 it
57. Id. at 269; see also id. at 289 (“[T]he increased deference of the Delaware courts to
market actors reflects the Delaware courts’ correct understanding that sophisticated shareholders
are better positioned to adjudge the merits of board decisions and to discipline disloyalty and
incompetence.” (emphasis added)). This belief seems deeply qualified by, among other things,
the scope of shareholder competence, such as whether it extends only to personal experience with
governance or whether it includes the intricacies incident to evaluating whether misconduct
occurred in a particular instance. The volition of the shareholder choice in deciding an issue and
the richness of the information on which shareholder action is based are two additional
considerations.
58. See Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential
Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 610, 620 & tbl.3 (2013) (reporting there were 1,164 hedge fund
campaigns between 2000 and 2007 with a 29 percent success rate); see also Gilson & Gordon,
supra note 13, at 867 (developing the basis to understand how the arrival in today’s market of the
activist shareholder addresses the reticence of many institutional holders to exercise their voting
power for changes in governance procedures and operations); see also generally Alon Brav, Wei
Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008) (gathering evidence regarding targets, methods and
consequences of hedge fund activism); Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of
Corporate Governance, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2015) (reviewing how institutional investors with
sizable holdings in companies have successfully targeted a range of corporate changes).
59. The Shareholder Rights Project at Harvard Law School has been actively assisting
institutional investors in pursuing these goals over the past several years. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
PROJECT, http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/TZA8-XF48].
60. See, e.g., Goshen & Hannes, supra note 7, at 269, 277–82. And weaknesses in shareholder
competence, to some extent, is regularly addressed via proxy advisors. See George W. Dent, Jr.,
A Defense of Proxy Advisors, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1287, 1288–89 (2014) (describing the rise
of proxy advisors as a response to collective action problems among shareholders); Leo E. Strine,
Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and
Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 688 (2005) (reporting on the supplicating steps company
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should not be overlooked that their foundations are based on a few
fragile organizations that could be wiped away with a regulatory brush.
We explore this concern later in Part III. Even in the current regulatory
environment, each of these modern corporate governance
developments involves shareholder preferences of how they wish to
participate in the governance of the firm. None of the matters depends
on the assessment of idiosyncratic facts or arcane principles of law
regarding a particular individual, event, or firm as do decisions
regarding whether misconduct might have occurred and, if so, whether
it is reasonable to initiate suit to redress the misbehavior. Simply
stated, governance questions such as board declassification involve
universal questions regarding the prerogatives of shareholders.61 Each
of these issues—and many others—now dotting the corporate
governance menu regularly serve up problems that are well within the
competence of the shareholders to consider; because they are so
shareholder centric, however, it is not reasonable to conflate such
governance developments coming from the force of institutions with
the belief that institutional voices can be the sole bulwark against
managerial misconduct.
The most basic disconnect committed by Corwin-esque thinking is
not appreciating that the endowments shareholders are assumed to
possess, which justify statutes calling for their approval for
fundamental transactions or governance matters, are very different
from the skills and experiences required to assess whether shareholder
or corporate interests are best served by prosecuting claims that
managers have engaged in misconduct. Whether the facts are sufficient
to support a claim that the officers or the directors breached a fiduciary
obligation when selling the company and whether the shareholder
believes twenty-five dollars is acceptable consideration for his shares
are both complex questions. Yet as observed above, the latter is no
more complex—and requires no more skill—than the initial decision
made by the investor to purchase the company’s shares at twenty
executives regularly undertake to obtain the approval of governance, compensation, and
acquisitions of proxy advisors). This, of course, is also subject to matters of expertise and
information constraints that the advisor may have in the particular case.
61. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 570–73
(1990) (identifying antitakeover amendments, confidential voting and greenmail prohibitions
among items within the focus of then rising activism of financial institutions); see also Kahan &
Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 15, at 1005–12 (describing the typical changes in corporate
governance as a result of shareholder voting and nonbinding shareholder proposals, including
majority elections for directors, de-staggered boards, declassification of boards, and changes to
executive compensation).
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dollars; the heuristics, whether they be discounted expected cash flow
or comparative book values or other inputs into share valuation
models, are the same. Alternatively, there is nothing about the
cognitive process by which a shareholder became a stakeholder in the
firm that mirrors the range of questions presented by a claim of
managerial misconduct. The purchase of shares does not require the
same skills that are necessary to answer questions regarding the facts
that can be established about the alleged skullduggery by managers,
the quantifiable harm that can be shown to have occurred, and the
associated probabilities with each of these questions. Simply stated,
shareholders are investors, not experienced corporate trial judges.
II. THE FRAGILE ECOLOGY OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER
VOTING
Those according shareholder approval votes as obviating further
inquiry into wrongdoing surrounding the approved transaction assume
that the corporate voting system will maintain in its existing form in the
future. As shown in this Part, however, that system is fragile, being
under attack by corporate management. There is no guarantee that the
system will survive that assault, and if it does not, then the intellectual
justification for Corwin and related cases will disappear. To explain this
point, this Part returns briefly to first principles to demonstrate why
corporate voting’s virility should not be assumed.
A. Key Elements of Institutional Investor Voting System
The basic problem in corporate voting is: Why does anyone vote
at all? Investor gains are often tiny, while the costs of becoming
informed are significant, even with the mandatory disclosure rules of
federal law.62 In addition, there are significant collective action
problems for investors; if there are any benefits derived from voting,
then nonvoters garner those benefits too—without incurring the costs
of voting.63 As a result, small investors have little incentive to vote their
shares.64

62. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1385.
63. See Robert B. Thompson, The Power of Shareholders in the United States, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 441, 449–50 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds.,
2015) (identifying costs incurred by institutional investors in voting their shares on an informed
basis).
64. Apathy among retail investors is a significant concern. Among S&P 500 companies, 21.7
percent of the shares were not voted in 2015. Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the “Absent”
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Institutional investors hold much larger stakes in public
corporations today65 and could, in theory, exert substantial influence
over corporate governance issues.66 These investors can expand their
influence by buying more stock, which increases their ability to capture
the gains from voting and reduces the uncertainty over the outcome in
a contested vote. Their power is limited, however, by the amount of
money that they can invest in any particular company as well as legal
rules, such as the poison pill67 and § 16(b) short-swing-profit
restrictions.68 The costs of voting in contested situations are also
substantial if institutions wish to win because, not only do they need to
be informed, they also have to incur the costs of coordinating the vote
and of persuading other investors.
As a result of these burdens, most institutional investors would
prefer not to vote on the majority of issues. For example, mutual funds
compete with each other on the basis of relative performance;
informed voting costs money that cuts into the firm’s performance
statistics, while any benefits from informed voting accrue to the fund
even if it chooses not to vote.69 To borrow a phrase from Gilson and
Gordon, mutual funds are “rationally reticent.”70 That is, they are
unwilling to invest in voting because it does not help them attract
business and may even cost them in their relationships with current and
existing clients. Similar issues arise for other types of institutional
investors such that it should not be assumed that if they were left to

Shareholders: A New Solution to Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 61 (2016).
Evidence that a good portion of this nonparticipation was by retail investors is that substantial
increases in the number of nonvoted shares followed regulatory changes in 2009 and 2011 that
removed the authority brokers once enjoyed to vote the shares they held in street name when not
instructed by their beneficial owners how their shares were to be voted. Id. at 61–62.
65. Institutions hold more than 50.6 percent of the stock of the largest 500 American
corporations. MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHAN RABIMOV, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE 2010
INVESTMENT
REPORT
22
tbl.10,
27
tbl.13
(2010),
INSTITUTIONAL
http://www.shareholderforum.com/e-mtg/Library/20101111_ConferenceBoard.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9JYL-D93Z].
66. See Black, supra note 61, at 570–75 (describing, for example, victories among pension
plans in supporting corporate governance proposals as well as institutional shareholders’
legislative lobbying efforts).
67. Id. at 550–51 (describing poison pill thresholds that set a maximum limit on shareholder
ownership in a company).
68. Id. at 545 (“Exchange Act section 16 requires . . . 10% beneficial owners of public
companies to report purchases and sales to the SEC and to forfeit any ‘short swing’ profits.”).
69. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1392–93.
70. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 13, at 895.
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their own devices, they would be interested in actively monitoring
corporate management using their voting power.
One significant exception is the activist hedge funds. These funds
purchase substantial blocks of targeted companies’ stock and then
aggressively agitate for changes at the firms.71 Hedge funds identify
value-enhancing, corporate-governance-related strategies and appeal
to institutional investors to support them in persuading corporate
management to implement them.72 In addition, other hedge funds
frequently follow the lead hedge fund, buying substantial amounts of
the targeted firm’s stock and then supporting the lead fund in its efforts
to bring about corporate governance changes.73 Top hedge funds’
voting initiatives have been very successful even when vigorously
opposed by corporate management.74 Even with the increased
presence of hedge funds, however, most institutions are reluctant to
spend significant resources on voting initiatives unless required to do
so.
Enter the government. In 1988, the Department of Labor declared
that institutions subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act75 must vote their stock in a manner that would maximize the value
of the fund’s portfolio.76 Failure to do so could result in plan trustees
or managers facing regulatory sanctions. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) passed a similar rule for mutual funds in 2003.77
Both rules incentivize fund managers to vote their fund’s shares even
when they might otherwise be tempted not to do so.78

71. Brav et al., supra note 58, at 1730.
72. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1394–95, 1416.
73. Id. at 1414–15.
74. See C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, The Second Wave of Hedge
Fund Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296, 308–09
(2016) (demonstrating that top hedge funds are quite successful in overcoming aggregate numbers
of takeover defenses).
75. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.)
76. Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Labor, to Helmuth
Fandl, Chairman of the Ret. Bd., Avon Prods., Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988), 1988 WL 897696.
77. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Advisers Act Release No. 2106, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585
(Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275 (2018)) [hereinafter Proxy Voting by Investment
Advisers].
78. Recently, however, both the Department of Labor and the SEC have backed away from
this requirement and allowed funds not to vote their shares when the costs of voting them exceed
its benefits. Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493,
526–27 (2018).
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Faced with a need to vote their shares in an informed manner, but
still not wanting to devote large amounts of their staff’s time and
energy to the endeavor, institutions instead choose to buy voting advice
from third-party voting advisors.79 These proxy-advisory firms
specialize in collecting information about upcoming corporate votes,
processing it, and providing advice to their institutional clients about
how to vote their shares.80 While many institutions do some of their
own research on important votes, they generally rely on proxy advisors
to assist them in uncontested situations.
The combination of the mandated institutional voting, third-party
proxy advisors’ research and voting recommendations, and activist
hedge funds initiating contested proxy-voting situations has led the
Delaware courts to lionize the corporate voting system and put
shareholder ratification on a pedestal.81 However, as shown in the next
Section, corporate management and their advisors, while welcoming
the cleansing effect now accorded shareholder ratification, are at the
same time urging the federal government, including the SEC, to
destroy the carefully built structure on which corporate voting rests.
B. Attacks on Corporate Voting System
Some commentators have suggested that the SEC should
reconsider its regulation of institutional investor voting. David Larcker
and Allan McCall penned a letter in The Wall Street Journal that
argued, “[t]he SEC should reconsider the entirety of the shareholder
voting process, including the mandate that institutional investors
participate in all corporate votes.”82 Their basic point is that
institutional investors should be free to make decisions about when it
is worthwhile for their beneficiaries to vote at all and that proxy advisor
recommendations should be grounded in research that shows they
enhance shareholder value.
Corporations have also attacked proxy advisors as too powerful
and subject to severe conflicts of interest.83 Commentators claimed that
there is a lack of transparency in how the proxy advisors arrive at their
voting recommendations and that there are potential conflicts of

79. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1397.
80. Id.
81. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312–14 (Del. 2015).
82. David F. Larcker & Allan L. McCall, Proxy Advisers Don’t Help Shareholders, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 9, 2013, at A17.
83. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1403–04.
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interest when advisory-firm employees serve as directors on boards of
companies that the advisors rated.84 There are claims of direct financial
conflicts where, for example, ISS’s consulting business markets its
services to corporate issuers, giving the appearance that corporate
clients might receive more favorable recommendations from the firm.85
Partly in response to these issues, the SEC in 2010 raised the
question of whether proxy advisory firms should be subjected to
regulatory oversight because their voting recommendations impact
voting at firms in which they held no economic stake.86 This issue and
others were discussed further at the Proxy Advisory Services
Roundtable held on December 5, 2014, where the SEC sought public
comment on the services provided by proxy advisory firms, conflicts of
interest, and the transparency and accuracy of their recommendations
to clients.87 Subsequently, Congress in 2017 considered the Corporate
Governance Reform and Transparency Act, H.R. 4015,88 which would
regulate proxy advisors like ISS and Glass Lewis by requiring them “to
register with the SEC and disclose among other things, the procedures
and methodologies [they use] to develop proxy voting
recommendations and any conflicts of interests.”89 On July 30, 2018,
SEC Chairman Jay Clayton announced that a second SEC roundtable
on the proxy process would be held.90 Clayton announced that among
the topics to be discussed are proxy advisory firms and whether they
suffer from conflicts of interest and lack transparency about their
84. Id. at 1404.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1403; see Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No.
62,495, Advisers Act Release No. 3052, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,340, 75 Fed.
Reg. 42,982, 43,011 (July 22, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 270, 274, 275).
87. Proxy Advisory Services Roundtable, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxy-advisory-services.shtml [https://perma.cc/Q4MZ-U3Z7].
88. Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency Act of 2017, H.R. 4015, 115th Cong.
(2017).
89. Steve Seelig & Puneet Arora, The Regulation of Proxy Advisors, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/03/theregulation-of-proxy-advisors [https://perma.cc/UD42-5NV5] (stating that the legislation is
“widely supported” by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable).
90. Jay Clayton, Statement Announcing SEC Staff Roundtable on the Proxy Process, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (July 30, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/statement-announcing-sec-staff-roundtable-proxy-process
[https://perma.cc/LSS5C822]; see also David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Proxy Voting and the Future of Corporations,
N.Y.
L.J.
(Nov.
28,
2018,
2:46
PM),
available
at
LAW .COM :
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/11/28/proxy-voting-and-the-future-ofcorporations [https://perma.cc/JQ8H-J6ZU] (summarizing the testimony and viewpoints of the
participants of the roundtable).
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voting recommendations.91 The Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs also held a full committee hearing on these
issues.92
In the meantime, on September 13, 2018, the SEC withdrew two
staff advisory letters that address the independence of proxy advisory
firms under SEC Rule 204 (4)-6 (“the Rule”).93 The SEC stated that
the letters were withdrawn in order to facilitate meaningful comments
from the public in anticipation of its upcoming roundtable.94 However,
according to The Wall Street Journal, the withdrawal came after six

91. Clayton elaborated on areas that might “warrant particular attention”:
•
Whether various factors, including legal requirements, have resulted in
investment advisers to funds and other clients relying on proxy advisory
firms for information aggregation and voting recommendations to a greater
extent than they should, and whether the extent of reliance on these firms is
in the best interests of investment advisers and their clients, including funds
and fund shareholders.
•
Whether issuers are being given an appropriate opportunity to raise
concerns if they disagree with a proxy advisory firm’s recommendations,
including, in particular, if the recommendation is based on erroneous,
materially incomplete, or outdated information.
•
Whether there is sufficient transparency about a proxy advisory firm’s voting
policies and procedures so that companies, investors, and other market
participants can understand how the advisory firm reached its voting
recommendations on a particular matter, and whether comparisons of
recommendations across similarly situated companies have value.
•
Whether there are conflicts of interest, including with respect to related
consulting services provided by proxy advisory firms, and, if so, whether
those conflicts are adequately disclosed and mitigated.
•
The appropriate regulatory regime for proxy advisory firms and whether
prior staff guidance about investment advisers’ responsibilities in voting
client proxies and retaining proxy advisory firms should be modified,
rescinded, or supplemented.
Clayton, supra note 90 (footnote omitted).
92. DAVID A. KATZ & LAURA A. MCINTOSH, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ,
SENATE COMMITTEE HOLDS HEARING ON PROXY VOTING PROCESS 1 (Dec. 7, 2018),
https://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/nonmember/docs/12_07_18_proxy.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZWZ7-H65Q].
93. The SEC issued a statement concerning the withdrawal of the two letters. Statement
Regarding Staff Proxy Advisory Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-regarding-staff-proxy-advisory-letters
[https://perma.cc/GGG3-N2EJ]. The withdrawn letters are: Egan-Jones Proxy Services, SEC NoAction Letter, 2004 WL 1201240 (May 27, 2004) [hereinafter Egan-Jones Letter]; Institutional
Shareholder Services, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 2093360 (Sept. 15, 2004) [hereinafter
ISS Letter].
94. SEC Withdraws Two No-Action Letters Regarding the Use of Proxy Advisory Firms –
Chairman Clayton Issues Statement Regarding Staff Views, ROPES & GRAY (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2018/09/SEC-Withdraws-Two-No-ActionLetters-Regarding-Use-of-Proxy-Advisory-Firms-Chairman [https://perma.cc/UNW9-RW4B]
[hereinafter ROPES & GRAY, SEC Withdraws Two No-Action Letters].
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Republican senators asked the Government Accountability Office to
determine whether the SEC overreached in issuing the two letters.95
The Rule regulates when investment advisors may vote their
client’s securities.96 When it was adopted in 2003, the SEC stated that
an investment advisor could meet its duties under the Rule, thereby
proving that their vote of the client’s securities was not a product of a
conflict of interest, by demonstrating that the advisor voted the proxies
in accordance with procedures based on the recommendations of an
“independent” proxy advisory firm.97 The withdrawn letters detailed in
what situations a proxy advisory firm might be considered
independent.98 Clearly, the SEC is actively considering completely
rewriting the rules that regulate proxy advisors. More pointedly, the
letters’ withdrawal was a barometer in forecasting political headwinds
for proxy advisors.
These forecasts proved accurate when, on August 21, 2019, the
SEC voted 3–2 along party lines to approve new guidance for proxy
voting by investment advisors and proxy advisory firms.99 Although the
precise impact of these new guidelines is still being debated as this

95. Dave Michaels, Public Companies Score a Win in Fight To Limit Reach of Proxy
Advisers, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2018, 3:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/public-companiesscore-a-win-in-fight-to-limit-reach-of-proxy-advisers-1536862260 [https://perma.cc/H29ZMCNK].
96. ROPES & GRAY, SEC Withdraws Two No-Action Letters, supra note 94 (“Th[e] Rule . . .
ensure[s] that investment advisers vote proxies in the best interest of their clients and provide
clients with information about how their proxies are voted.”).
97. Id. (“[T]he SEC stated that an investment adviser could demonstrate that its vote of its
clients’ proxies was not a product of a conflict of interest if the adviser voted the proxies in
accordance with a pre-determined policy based on the recommendations of an ‘independent’
proxy advisory firm.”).
98. Id. The Egan-Jones Letter confirmed that a proxy advisory firm could still be considered
independent, even if it has been given compensation by a corporate entity being evaluated for
other services. Id. The ISS letter stated that neither an individual nor a case-by-case evaluation of
a proxy advisory firm’s conflict procedures was necessary, but that instead an investment advisor
may determine that a proxy advisory firm is able to make independent decisions by reviewing its
conflict procedures overall. Id.
99. Commission Guidance Regarding Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment Advisers,
Investment Company Act Release No. IC-33605, 84 Fed. Reg. 47420 (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5325.pdf [https://perma.cc/MA7W-ED3P]; Commission
Interpretation and Guidance Regarding the Applicability of the Proxy Rules to Proxy Voting
Advice, Exchange Act Release No. 34-86721, 84 Fed. Reg. 47416 (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/34-86721.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B84-TBLM]; SEC Issues
Guidance To Clarify Investment Advisers’ Proxy Voting Responsibilities and the Treatment of
Proxy Advice Under the Proxy Rules, ROPES & GRAY (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2019/08/SEC-Issues-Guidance-to-ClarifyInvestment-Advisers-Proxy-Voting-Responsibilities [https://perma.cc/G228-YFBW].
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Article goes to press, “[b]usiness groups that pushed for such changes,
including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National
Association of Manufacturers, applauded the SEC’s action, while
advocacy groups such as the Council for Investor Rights and Corporate
Accountability said [they] would limit shareholders’ ability to hold
companies accountable.”100 As Commissioner Allison Herren Lee
stated, the new guidance first “introduces increased costs and time
pressure into an already byzantine and highly compressed process.
Second, it calls for more issuer involvement in the process despite
widespread agreement among institutional investors and investment
advisors that greater involvement will undermine the reliability and
independence of voting recommendations.”101 Finally, we note that
those who believe the institutional investor voice can substitute for
state fiduciary duty law, such as appears to be the case in some
Delaware cases,102 speak of an era that appears to be changing. The era
that appears to be passing is one where a great many large institutions
relied on proxy-advisor expertise rather than their own. The recent
developments at the SEC suggest a reversal of this practice, although
it is hard at this point to gauge fully its impact.
In addition to new regulations for proxy advisors, consider the
future of the dominant activist investor. Hedge fund activists’
leadership on voting initiatives rests upon their ability to generate
value for themselves and other shareholders. However, whether hedge
funds increase value is a hotly contested question. Their detractors
argue that, while there are often short-term value increases associated
with hedge fund activism, these gains come at the expense of the long-

100. Andrew Ramonas & Andrea Vittorio, SEC Answers Pleas To Rein in Proxy Firms ISS,
L.
(Aug.
21,
2019,
11:27
AM),
Glass
Lewis
(2),
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X7M77JQS000000?bna_news_filter=securities-law
&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016caf89d2d0a1fdffb933c30001#jcite [https://perma.cc/MCR9DRJZ].
101. Statement of Commissioner Allison Herren Lee on Proxy Voting and Proxy Solicitation
&
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
(Aug.
21,
2019),
Releases,
U.S.
SEC.
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-lee-082119 [https://perma.cc/YR68-FFFP].
102. In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holder Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 444 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“[C]orporate law
should not be designed on the assumption that diversified investors are infirm but instead should
give great deference to transactions approved by them voluntarily and knowledgeably.”); see
Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313–314 (Del. 2015) (“When the real parties in
interest—the disinterested equity owners—can easily protect themselves at the ballot box by
simply voting no, the utility of a litigation-intrusive standard of review promises more costs to the
stockholders in the form of litigation rents and inhibitions on risk-taking than it promises in terms
of benefits to them.”).
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term value of the targeted companies.103 Prominent corporate attorney
Martin Lipton has argued that the omnipresent threat of hedge fund
interventions has led corporate management to manage companies for
the short term rather than focusing on long-term value enhancement.104
Moreover, even if hedge funds generate value, they do so at a
significant cost: hedge fund managers are extremely well paid for their
efforts, typically receiving 15–20 percent of net fund profits and a 1–2
percent management fee on invested funds.105 Despite their fee
structure, successful hedge fund managers have been able to attract
institutional investors to invest in their funds and have frequently been
able to persuade them to vote in their favor in contested situations.106
However, there are also regulatory initiatives that would
adversely affect hedge funds that the SEC has recently considered. One
proposal that has been debated actively is to reduce the ten-day waiting
period for early warning Rule 13d filings to shorten the number of days
that hedge funds have before they must disclose their positions in
targeted firms.107 While this proposal was not adopted, there continues
to be substantial pressure on regulators from corporate management
and their supporters to weaken activist hedge funds.108

103. Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds and Other Activist Investors, HARV.
L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 26, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2017/01/26/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-and-other-activist-investors [https://perma.cc/
74CD-P59W] (“There are, however, encouraging signs that major investors are increasingly
concerned that hedge-fund activism is undermining long-term value, and that they are ready to
support well-run companies and their long-term strategies against short-term activist attacks.”).
One recent study found that in the long-term, hedge fund activism had no significant effect on
firm value. Ed deHaan, David Larcker & Charles McClure, Long-Term Economic Consequences
of Hedge Fund Activist Interventions 7, 18–23 (ECGI Working Paper Series in Fin., Working
Paper No. 577/2018, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3260095 [https://perma.cc/P54U-GM5X].
104. See Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds and Other Activist Investors, supra note
103 (stating that non-hedge fund investors, as a result of hedge fund activism, have begun to
support companies in their long-term strategies to resist “short-term activist attacks”).
105. See Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1408 (discussing the compensation incentives of
hedge fund managers).
106. See id. at 1415–18 (detailing institutional investors’ support for hedge fund activism).
107. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder
Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39 (2012) (highlighting the SEC’s proposal to shorten the
current waiting period).
108. See, e.g., Adam O. Emmerich, Theodore N. Mirvis, Eric S. Robinson & William Savitt,
Fair Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some Thoughts on the Law and Economics of Blockholder
Disclosure, and the Use and Abuse of Shareholder Power, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 135, 137 (2013)
(discussing and defending a petition from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to the SEC arguing
that the 13(d) disclosure rules should be changed from ten days to one day).
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To summarize this discussion, each of the critical links in the
corporate voting system, which has been lauded by the Delaware
courts as providing investor oversight of managerial conduct in sales of
the firm and in controlling-shareholder self-dealing, is under attack.
Losing any one of these important planks—mandatory institutional
voting, well-informed proxy advisors, or hedge fund leadership on
corporate voting issues—will have a devastatingly negative impact on
the effectiveness of shareholder monitoring via their voting power.
Proponents of shareholder ratification as a cleansing device for
managerial misconduct, such as Wachtell Lipton,109 often appear to be
simultaneously lobbying to undermine the foundations of effective
shareholder voting.110 We would hope that the Delaware courts would
at least be sensitive to the dangers that these “reform” efforts will have
on the effectiveness of corporate voting as a ratification device.
III. CONFLICTED VOTING CASTS DOUBT ON THE LEGITIMACY OF
SHAREHOLDER RATIFICATION
Ratification voting frequently suffers from conflicts of interest.111
When this happens in a merger, the shareholders voting—often large
institutional investors—may not be voting to maximize the value of the

109. See, e.g., William Savitt, Wachtell Lipton Discusses Post-Closing Merger Litigation—The
Road Ahead, COLUM. L. SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 28, 2019),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/01/28/wachtell-lipton-discusses-post-closing-mergerlitigation-the-road-ahead [https://perma.cc/AD4V-Z3MD] (“The evolving doctrine affirms the
view that, with sophisticated institutional investors now dominating equity markets, the courts
can (and as a matter of efficiency should) avoid extensive litigation-driven second-guessing in the
great run of transactional situations.”).
110. For example, three Wachtell Lipton partners state:
Although the [SEC Commissioner’s] guidance does not eliminate the fundamental
structural concerns that such vast power has been given to a small group of companies
that own no shares, are largely unaccountable and appear to have business imperatives
to create ever-evolving “best practices,” it will hopefully lead to more thoughtful and
responsible use of proxy voting advice and propel further action to ensure greater
disclosure regarding conflicts of interest, lack of transparency and other concerns that
have been expressed concerning the proxy advisory industry.
David A. Katz, Trevor S. Norwitz & Sabastian V. Niles, Wachtell Lipton Discusses SEC
Regulatory Guidance on Proxy Advisory Firms and Proxy Voting Responsibilities, COLUM. L.
SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July 2, 2014), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/07/02/
wachtell-lipton-discusses-sec-regulatory-guidance-on-proxy-advisory-firms-and-proxy-votingresponsibilities [https://perma.cc/W376-4HFQ].
111. See generally Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in
Corporate Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1151 (2019) (discussing institutional investor conflicts of interest
in the context of mutual fund intermediaries).
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target firm but rather to further some other interest.112 In this Part, we
focus on some of the key conflicts of interest that emerge. We argue
that these conflicts impact a significant percentage of the shares voted
to approve mergers, undercutting the claim that the approval vote
reflects shareholders’ preferences to absolve corporate management of
legal liability.
A

Institutional Conflicts of Interest

Private corporate pension plans are run by trustees who are
selected by the management of the firm whose employees are the
fund’s beneficiaries.113 The private pension fund can be invested in the
sponsoring company’s stock and, not surprisingly, will vote those
shares in a manner designed to please corporate management.114 More
broadly, the managerial orientation pervades private pension funds so
that the funds tilt heavily toward supporting the management of
portfolio companies.115 In a merger, private pension funds will probably
vote their shares in favor of the transaction, even where it may not be
a value-maximizing deal. This is especially true if they have a bigger
investment in the target than the bidder.116
Mutual funds also face conflicts that arise from employers’ control
of what funds will be available for their employees for retirement
planning.117 Employers have wide latitude to decide which funds they
offer to their workers. As a result, mutual fund managers are reluctant
to vote their shares against the wishes of corporate management and,
more generally, are hesitant to earn a reputation of being
antimanagement.118 In the context of a merger, target and acquirer
112. See Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from Control,
33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 887 (2010) (“Institutional intermediaries and their decision-makers
hold a variety of complex economic interests that challenge their incentive to maximize firm
value.”).
113. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1401.
114. See Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds, 85
J. FIN. ECON. 552, 554, 568–69 (2007) (giving examples of mutual funds’ conflicts of interest in
corporate governance and finding “that the more business ties a fund company has, the less likely
it is to vote in favor of shareholder proposals that are opposed by management”).
115. See Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1401 (suggesting that ties between pension plan
managers and corporate managers could affect funds’ voting).
116. Id.; cf. Griffith & Lund, supra note 111, at 1175.
117. See Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1402–03; Griffith & Lund, supra note 111, at 1178–
79.
118. See Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1402–03 (“Employers can choose from a wide
variety of funds and fund managers and are loath to cast votes that might cause employers to cut
off their access to employees’ retirement money.”).
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management both wish to see the deal approved, providing a powerful
incentive to mutual fund managers to vote favorably on the deal.
Additionally, mutual funds with a reputation of not supporting the
management of their portfolio firms face challenges when hawking
their services to corporate managers as desirable components of a
firm’s retirement options for its employees. Given the huge size of the
mutual fund market, it is frequently the case that collectively these
funds are the largest single voters on the transaction.119
Labor union pension funds may suffer from a different type of bias
in a merger context: they may seek to maximize the value of labor’s
share of the deal rather than maximizing the value of shareholders’
returns in the transaction.120 This problem arises because labor union
shareholders wear two hats: they generally vote like other shareholders
on issues that do not affect them in their capacity as workers, but in
situations where they are voting on issues that affect their jobs or future
as workers in a company, they may well vote in their interests as
workers at the expense of shareholders.121 In some mergers, where the
acquirer seeks to eliminate workers by reducing benefits, union
shareholders may have a strong interest in voting against the
transaction even though it is value increasing for shareholders.122
Public pension plans, such as CalPERS, may also have a different
type of conflict. Their trustees are often politicians or political
appointees. The political interests of a fund’s trustees may lead them
to direct merger votes in a way that maximizes their own welfare, even
though it does not increase the value of their fund’s stock holdings.123
This may cause the fund to promote politically valuable transactions at
the expense of its own beneficiaries by approving value-decreasing
mergers.124
SEC rules contain provisions that require funds in these
circumstances to have policies and practices to explain how the funds
119. Id. at 1386, 1387 tbl.1. The high degree of market concentration in the mutual fund
business may mitigate this conflict, as the largest funds may be less concerned about losing a single
client because of a merger. Id. at 1403.
120. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1075–77 (1998) (discussing
various conflict-of-interest issues that arise in the context of labor union pension funds).
121. Id. at 1074 (“On the one hand, [labor unions] could be attempting to increase firm value
in order to maximize their residual share as shareholders. On the other hand, they could be
sacrificing their shareholder value in order to protect jobs or otherwise help their members.”).
122. Id.
123. See Fisch, supra note 112, at 883 (providing examples of this conflict).
124. Id.
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resolve material conflicts of interest.125 Under these rules, investment
advisors have a fiduciary duty to vote the securities held by their funds
under practices and policies that ensure their votes are cast in their
beneficiaries’ best interest.126 However, these rules are weakly
enforced with few resources devoted toward identifying violations and
little enforcement activity.127
B. Proxy Advisors’ Conflicts of Interest
Institutional investors generally hold diversified portfolios of
stocks in order to minimize the risks that are associated with any
individual firm’s securities. For larger institutions, this could mean that
they own thousands of different companies’ stocks and have voting
obligations at a huge number of corporate meetings.128 In order to
comply with their fiduciary obligations, the institutional investor would
need to devote a considerable amount of its staff’s time to digesting
corporate proxy statements—even in routine voting situations—which
consequently increases its operating costs.129 To avoid reducing returns
to investors and beneficiaries, institutions retain third-party voting
advisors, such as ISS and Glass Lewis, to assist them in performing
their voting duties.130 These proxy advisors analyze the proxy
information that companies supply to their investors and then
formulate voting recommendations for their institutional clients.131 In
some cases, these firms actually vote the clients’ shares on their behalf
pursuant to certain voting policies.132

125. See Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 77 (describing required policies
and procedures under rule 206(4)-6).
126. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1396.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 1397 (referencing “tens of thousands of votes cast each year” at large
institutions).
129. Letter from Jonathan Feigelson, Senior Vice President, Gen. Counsel & Head of Corp.
Governance, Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. & Coll. Ret. Equities Fund (“TIAACREF”), to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 8, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-263.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E2MQ-XJSR]
(“Though we dedicate a significant amount of resources to corporate governance research and
the voting of proxies, we still would have difficulty processing the 80,000 plus unique agenda items
voted by our staff annually without utilizing [proxy firm] research.”).
130. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1397–99.
131. See, e.g., The ISS Advantage, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS.,
https://www.issgovernance.com/about/about-iss [https://perma.cc/QW8W-LC2G] (discussing the
process by which proxy advisors provide services to their clients).
132. Id.
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As seen in the preceding Part, critics have argued that proxy
advisors should be subject to SEC regulation because they influence
voting at companies where they have no economic stake.133 These same
critics have further stated that proxy advisory firms are not transparent
about how they formulate their voting recommendations, that they
may have political biases, and that they may sit on corporate boards of
companies while making recommendations to their clients about how
that stock should be voted.134
More importantly, in some instances, the proxy advisors—notably
ISS—appear to suffer from conflicts of their own. Namely, these
advisors are selling services to the very corporate issuers whose shares
they are directing other institutional clients about how to vote.135
Issuers are concerned that their willingness to purchase these services
from ISS may indirectly influence the voting recommendations issued
by ISS.136 Despite ISS’s claims that they have built an internal wall
between these two pieces of its business—and its institutional investors
clients’ apparent satisfaction with those efforts—the potential for this
conflict remains a topic of great interest to corporate issuers.137 To the
extent that this conflict, or the others identified in the preceding
paragraph, results in institutional investors voting their shares partly or
wholly in reliance on tainted recommendations, there is the potential
for shareholder-ratification votes to deviate from what is in the best
interests of the shareholders of the target firm.

133. See, e.g., Letter from Tom Quaadman, Exec. Dir., Fin. Reporting & Inv’r Opportunity,
Cent. for Capital Mkts. Competitiveness, to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n
(Aug.
5,
2010),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-26.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AY9K-FPQF] (criticizing proxy advisors’ involvement in the voting process);
James R. Copland, Opinion, Politicized Proxy Advisers vs. Individual Investors, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
7, 2012, 7:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000087239639044462010457801225212563290
8 [https://perma.cc/9CT2-9JSS] (same).
134. Copland, supra note 133.
135. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1404.
136. Id. (“ISS has a separate consulting business on voting issues that is marketed to issuers.
Issuers that purchase those services may improve their chances of getting a favorable
recommendation from ISS . . . .”).
137. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-765, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER
MEETINGS: ISSUES RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON PROXY
VOTING 10-11 (2007), https://www.gao.gov/assets/270/263233.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CPZDVCM] (describing institutional investors’ satisfaction with ISS’s mitigation of potential conflicts
and the additional steps institutional investors take to ensure ISS’s independence).
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C. Empty Voting
In addition to the practices examined earlier in Part I, many hedge
funds hold large positions in target companies when the acquisition is
announced.138 Such holders sometimes resort to sophisticated financialhedging strategies to eliminate their financial interest in the target firm
whilst retaining their voting rights on the merger.139 This is one
dimension of a phenomenon called “empty voting.”140 In a simple case,
if the hedge fund holds shares in the target firm while simultaneously
selling them short, they can retain a vote on the transaction yet still
benefit from a decline in the target’s stock price.141 This would give the
fund an incentive to vote against the merger even when it is value
maximizing for other shareholders. Conversely, the hedge fund could
structure the transaction so that it benefits from approving a merger
that is value decreasing for other shareholders.142 In both of these
situations, the ratification vote may stem from the hedge fund’s conflict
of interest and not from any view it has about potential managerial
misconduct.
The true extent of empty-voting transactions is unknown, and
there are relatively few instances that have been publicly disclosed.143
However, such hedging has expanded with the growth of sophisticated
securities-derivatives markets.144 Given the importance of hedge funds
as a driver of M&A activity in today’s markets, it seems likely that they
will find themselves in this position in the future.

138. See Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1409 (noting that, on average, hedge funds take
larger ownership stakes in target companies than other types of investors).
139. See Griffith & Lund, supra note 111, at 1172–73.
140. Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 815 (2006).
141. See id. at 828 (providing examples of empty voting through purchases of hedged shares);
Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1406 (“By holding shares in a corporation while simultaneously
selling them short, an investor can retain a vote in the corporation yet still benefit from a decline
in the price of the stock.”).
142. See Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1406 (stating that empty voting can “lead to a vote
that does not maximize firm value”).
143. Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II:
Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 652, 659 (2008) (“How much decoupling
activity is there? Without effective disclosure, we don’t know.”). For several examples of publicly
disclosed empty voting, see Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1405–06 & n.207.
144. See generally Hu & Black, supra note 143 (stating that the emergence of over-the-counter
equity derivatives permits the separation of voting rights from economic interest to occur
quickly).
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D. Cross-Ownership Conflicted Voting
As another investment strategy, some activist hedge funds have
frequently taken large positions in target company stocks in merger
transactions.145 In some of these cases, the hedge funds have purchased
positions in both the target and the acquirer, and they have voted their
stock in a manner that maximizes the value of their overall portfolio.146
This form of voting conflict has been called a “cross-ownership
conflict.”147 The empirical evidence shows that the ownership splits that
underlie these conflicts are rampant in our economy.148 For example,
“share ownership has become so concentrated that ‘in a hypothetical
conflict between two S&P 500 firms in 2005, 15% of the equity in either
firm would on average be held by institutional investors that prefer the
other side to win.’”149
Mutual funds frequently find themselves in this position as well
because they hold diversified portfolios that contain shares of many
different stocks.150 Many of their passively managed index funds hold
stakes in virtually all public companies of any size.151 When these funds
hold shares in both the target and the acquirer, they vote their shares
in both companies to maximize the overall value of their portfolio.152
In mergers between two public companies, the mutual fund needs to
weigh the impact of the merger on both parties to the transaction. Its
145. As we demonstrate in Part V infra, a substantial amount of target company stock is
controlled by merger arbitrageurs. See infra Table 3. For additional discussion of merger
arbitrage, see sources cited infra notes 225–28.
146. See generally Jarrad Harford, Dirk Jenter & Kai Li, Institutional Cross-Holdings and
Their Effect on Acquisition Decisions, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 27 (2011) (finding a rapid increase in such
“cross-holdings” and exploring their effect on value-reducing transactions).
147. See Griffith & Lund, supra note 111, at 1172.
148. Id. at 1173.
149. Id. (quoting Ann M. Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, 44 J. CORP. L. 297, 310 (2018)).
150. Id.
151. See Edward Rock & Marcel Kahan, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let
Shareholders Be Shareholders 1 (Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 18-39,
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3295098 [https://perma.cc/SKS2S8D4] (“Index funds . . . have grown to be the largest investors in the capital markets and have
received disproportionate attention.”); John C. Bogle, Bogle Sounds a Warning on Index Funds,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2018, 10:15 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bogle-sounds-a-warning-onindex-funds-1543504551 [https://perma.cc/N4MX-X84G] (noting that index funds control, not
just own, a large fraction of the vote in U.S. corporations—almost 30 percent—and that if the
trends continue, those funds will control virtually all); Jordan Wathen, Vanguard’s Founder
Warns That Index Funds Could Become Too Big to Function, MOTLEY FOOL (Dec. 1, 2018, 6:00
PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/12/01/vanguards-founder-warns-that-index-fundscould-bec.aspx [https://perma.cc/B2EM-4TCQ] (same).
152. Id.
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fiduciary duties require it to vote its stock to maximize the value of its
beneficiaries’ interests.153 In other words, it must weigh both the impact
of the deal on the acquirer and its frequently opposite effect on the
target. If the stock value of a mutual fund’s acquirer is increasing by a
sufficient amount to offset its portfolio’s losses to the target company,
then the fund could very well vote its shares in favor of the transaction
that is a negative wealth-creating deal for the target.154 Furthermore,
this effect is magnified by some mutual funds’ practice of voting all of
the shares in their entire family of funds in the same manner, even
when some of its individual funds may have differing economic
interests.155
There is some empirical evidence that supports the claim that this
cross-ownership conflict is a significant issue for ratification purposes.
A recent study by Brooks, Chen, and Zeng found that institutional
cross-ownership between firms increases the likelihood of the two
firms merging but also reduces the deal premium that is paid in the
deal.156 They also found that cross-holders were more likely to vote for
mergers that had negative announcement returns, while mutual funds
without cross-holdings were more likely to vote against them.157 This
suggests that cross-holders’ shareholder-ratification votes in mergers
may be favorable for target management but at the expense of the
target company’s shareholders.
The preceding review of existing conflicts that confront each
category of institutional investors erodes any confidence that
shareholders vote in a manner that increases their common good.
These conflicts are consistent with the voting results in deal
transactions reviewed in the next Part.
IV. CONFOUNDING THE PROBLEM: THE CASE OF DISTORTED
CHOICE
The institutional limitations reviewed above—limits on the
individual endowments of shareholders, inherent boundaries of their
acting in a forum that necessarily prevents meaningful engagement of

153. See Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 77.
154. See Griffith and Lund, supra note 111, at 1174.
155. See id. at 1170–71 (discussing high uniformity in voting across funds, even when the views
of portfolio managers differ).
156. Chris Brooks, Zhong Chen & Yeqin Zeng, Institutional Cross-Ownership and Corporate
Strategy: The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions, 48 J. CORP. FIN. 187, 189 (2018).
157. Id. at 212.
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the issues, and conflicting interests that shareholders can face—are not
the only problems with according shareholder approval a cleansing
role. An equally looming malady with contemporary corporate norms
is that courts allow the shareholder approval of the transaction to
excuse any misconduct managers may have committed in connection
with that transaction. Simply stated, the norm celebrated in Corwin,
followed in other contexts in Delaware and well received outside of
Delaware, is that it is permissible to bundle in a single resolution the
deal’s approval as well as a concurrent vote excusing managerial
misconduct that occurred or may have occurred during that
transaction.
A. Inherent Coercion
For shareholder approval to shield management adequately from
accusations of wrongdoing, a threshold requirement is that the
approval not be coerced.158 Decisions that treat a shareholder vote
approving the transactions as also surrounding that transaction with
presumptions of the business judgment rule,159 as Corwin did, bundle
two related but profoundly distinct issues into a single resolution. This
Section examines whether such a bundled resolution itself is corrupted
because the resulting stockholder approval is the product of a distorted
vote that combines a positive-value resolution—the merger—with a
negative-value item—absolving managers of failing to secure a better
transaction. Inherent in finding a distorted choice is that the decision
entails at least some level of coercion. However, the courts have yet to
explore the meaning of coercion fully in the context of shareholder
voting on mergers.
Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp.160 illustrates the limits of
a court’s engagement with the issue of coercion. In acquiring Time
Warner Cable and Bright House Networks, Charter Communications
entered into two contracts: one involving the issuance of shares and
another granting a proxy to its largest stockholder, Liberty
Broadband.161 Charter conditioned the two lucrative acquisitions on a
vote by the disinterested shareholders approving both the share

158. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 308–12 (Del. 2015).
159. Id. at 313 (supporting the reasoning of its holding as “tied to the core rationale of the
business judgment rule”).
160. Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., No. 11418-VCG, 2017 WL 2352152 (Del. Ch.
May 31, 2017).
161. Id. at *4.
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issuance and the proxy transactions.162 Following shareholder
approval, Matthew Sciabacucchi, a Charter stockholder, initiated a
shareholders’ suit challenging the share issuance and proxy as unfair to
Charter and the product of a breach of fiduciary duty by its director
and largest stockholder.163 Charter moved to dismiss the case, arguing
that because the share issuance and the proxy transactions had been
approved by a majority of disinterested Charter stockholders, they
were presumptively valid.164 The Court of Chancery rejected the
argument, stating: “[R]atification will not cleanse a transaction where
the vote is structurally coercive.”165 It defined a vote as “structurally
coercive” when “the directors have created a situation where a vote
may be said to be in avoidance of a detriment created by the structure
of the transaction the fiduciaries have created, rather than a free choice
to accept or reject the proposition voted on.”166 The court elaborated
on this position:
“Coercion” is a loaded term, but a vote so structured by the
Defendants, to accept one (allegedly self-interested) transaction so as
not to lose the benefit of another independent transaction, cannot to
my mind be considered uncoerced. . . . The stockholders did not
decide, necessarily, that the Liberty Share Issuances and the Voting
Proxy Agreement were “in their best interest,” they only decided that
the Acquisitions and the Issuances and Voting Proxy Agreement
were, on net, beneficial. The facts are sufficient to an inference that
the Liberty Share Issuances (and the Voting Proxy Agreement) were
unnecessary to the Acquisitions. If so, and if such a vote were
cleansing, then fiduciaries could attach self-dealing riders to any
transaction under consideration, and avoid being held to account by
a favorable stockholder vote. That is not equity; it would represent,
not a cleanse, but a white-wash.167

We do not believe it is a long step—indeed, we view it as a logical
step—to view the shareholders’ approval of a merger with awareness
that such approval cures any possible misconduct in the transaction as
similarly coercive. Just as in Liberty Broadband, an approving vote can
only be seen as consistent with the view shareholders accorded their
approval of both the acquisition and its accompanying misconduct as
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *4.
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“on net, beneficial.”168 It is not reasonable to believe the legal
consequence of such bundling should turn on whether there are
separate, interconnected resolutions, as in Liberty Broadband, or a
single resolution. Coercion arises in both instances by virtue of their
being bundled together.
B. Bundling in the Courts
Ratification finds its roots in the law of agency, where it developed
as a series of processes for the principal to become legally bound by the
unauthorized acts of her agent.169 Thus, most of agency law’s focus is
on correcting the agent’s lack of authority and not directly on
approving or excusing the agent’s unfaithful or reckless tortious acts.
In the latter situation, with a single or only a few principals, misconduct
by the agent can be examined as in any other area where individual
bargaining is possible. As the enterprise becomes larger in terms of
more owners and layers of authority, the principal–agent analogy
becomes at least attenuated, if not breaking down entirely.170
A business entity with multiple owners is a very different setting
than the single-principal-single-agent setting. The corporate context is
even more removed from the classic agency model: officers and
directors are not agents of the owners and, as seen above, the owner’s
prerogatives and endowments are more limited than the classic
principal’s powers in the law of agency. Nonetheless, share ownership,
however otherwise circumscribed, has long carried with it the power to
168. Id.
169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 82 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
170. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997), continues to be the most thoughtful
corporate decision addressing shareholder ratification. Chancellor Allen denied the defendants’
motion to dismiss a suit challenging Mattel’s stock-option plan as wasteful and self-interested
after the plan had been approved by the stockholders. Id. at 329. The opinion usefully explains
the possible ways to conceptualize a ratifying vote of the shareholders:
[Ratification] provides, after the fact, the grant of authority that may have been
wanting at the time of the agent’s act. Another [way of conceptualizing ratification]
might be to view the ratification as consent or as an estoppel by the principal to deny a
lack of authority. In either event the effect of informed ratification is to validate or
affirm the act of the agent as the act of the principal.
Id. at 334–35 (citation omitted).
Lewis also observes that flowing from the fiduciary relationship between the principal
and the agent are requirements that the ratification be preceded by full disclosure and that there
is no coercion of the approval. Id. at 335. Chancellor Allen emphasized how the collective decision
of numerous shareholders complicates the ratification vote in comparison to the single principal
context of the law of agency. Id. He observed that this causes corporate law to make two
important adjustments: the approving vote must exclude the vote of self-interested parties, and
shareholders lack the authority to approve corporate waste. Id.

COX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/21/2019 4:50 PM

2019] THE (IR)RELEVANCE OF SHAREHOLDER VOTES 545
ratify managerial and controlling-stockholder misconduct, such that it
is now a cornerstone of corporate law that a fully informed, noncoerced
vote of the stockholders is a proper ratification. What varies across
states are the types of misconduct that is beyond ratification and the
effect that such shareholder approval has on matters like the burden of
proof and the legal standard by which the conduct will be judged. Our
initial focus is not on either of these questions. We instead make the
point that courts have rushed to embrace the substantive niceties of
ratification—full disclosure, no coercion, and effects of an approving
vote—but have failed to consider fully the threshold question: Should
ratification occur only in a freestanding vote?
The ALI’s corporate governance project deals with shareholder
ratification in only two discrete contexts: shareholder resolutions
approving dismissal of a derivative suit171 and shareholder approval of
self-dealing transactions.172 The ALI approach on the question of
bundling, however, is different in each of the two settings. When
dealing with the process and effect of shareholder approval of selfdealing, the ALI comment states in its definition of “disinterested
shareholder[]” approval in Section 1.16 that “[i]f a shareholder vote is
required to be and is taken to authorize a transaction under applicable
state corporation statutes, it can be combined with a vote under
§ 1.16.”173 Although the use of “combined” leaves open the question of
whether this refers to a combination in a single resolution so that
bundling is contemplated, the ALI confines the consequences of any
approving vote to overcoming adverse inferences that historically
attach to self-dealing transactions where organic corporate law
requires shareholder approval of the transaction. In contrast, dismissal
of a derivative suit as a consequence of shareholder approval must, per
the ALI, occur in a separate resolution that clearly sets forth the factual

171. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.11.
172. 1 id. § 1.16 cmt. c.
173. Id. The other important law reform effort is the American Bar Association’s Model
Business Corporation Act, which takes no express provision on bundling, but it should be read as
permitting the resolution involving a “conflicting interest transaction” to be the same shareholder
approved resolution as required for the transaction to be affected. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§§ 8.61(b)(2), .63(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (requiring that the transaction is duly noticed as
requiring shareholder approval, the conflicted director discloses to the corporation of shares the
director believes are interested in the transaction, and there is full disclosure of material facts);
see also id. § 8.60(7) (broadly defining the disclosure required in conflict of interest transactions).
The Model Act is clear that its technical provisions address only the “conflicting interest
transaction” and not the board’s failure “to conform with general standards of director conduct.”
Id. § 8.61 cmt. 2.
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and legal issues surrounding the matter.174 Therefore, within the ALI
scheme, bundling that involves misconduct that neither supports a
derivative action nor involves classic forms of self-dealing is not
addressed directly.
The great bulk of deal-driven litigation falls within this large
lacuna neglected by the ALI. This type of litigation focuses on lapses
in processes pursued by directors or officers in their carrying out the
transaction. We are thus left to surmise which of the two strands of
thinking embraced by the ALI should guide a court’s consideration of
bundling. We believe there are bases to believe that the ALI puts a
heavy thumb on the scale against bundling, or at least against according
an approving shareholder vote full, insulating qualities. First, the ALI’s
treatment of self-dealing transactions can be seen as burden-shifting
mechanisms because, even after an admittedly fully informed
disinterested vote, the plaintiff still can pursue a claim that the
transaction was so one-sided as to constitute waste.175
Second, the nonbundling choice for dismissal of derivative suits—
an inquiry into the transaction’s fairness—is much closer to the type of
issues posed in the ratification at the heart of deal-generated litigation
where the issue is whether managerial misconduct occurred in a
corporate transaction. The central considerations for fairness in selfdealing have historically been whether there was ample disclosure of
the insider’s interest in the transaction and whether the transaction was
financially fair.176 Financial fairness is assumed to be the central focus
of shareholders who are asked to approve an organic transaction.
However, fairness is not at the heart of claims based on inadequate
processes pursued by directors to approve the transaction. The
transaction could easily be within a range of fairness, but managerial
misconduct could still have harmed the shareholders by not securing a
price higher up within the range that fairness spans. Thus, although the
fairness prong of the self-dealing inquiry may be satisfied, the
174. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.11(a) (addressing
procedures whereby a derivative suit can be dismissed upon approval of the shareholders and
calling for “[a] resolution recommending such dismissal” (emphasis added)). The provision
mandates that the resolution submitted to the stockholders be the product of a fully developed
examination by the board of directors or committee of the directors sufficient to support a court
dismissing the suit were the recommendation made by the directors. Id. (linking the resolution’s
content to the procedures set forth in §§ 7.09(a)(1)–(3) and 7.10(a)).
175. See, e.g., 1 id. § 5.02(a)(2)(D) (stating that the duty of fair dealing is satisfied where, inter
alia, the transaction does not constitute waste).
176. See, e.g., In re Wheelabrator Techs. Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 11495, 1992 WL 212595, at
*2–9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 1992) (evaluating a motion to dismiss with this standard).
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managers might still face a claim that even better terms could have
been garnered for the shareholders but for their misconduct.
Third, in the section that the ALI devotes to the conduct of
shareholder litigation, nonbundling was embraced. Thus, were a
derivative suit filed for management misconduct in a self-dealing
transaction, for which the defense is impartial ratification by the
shareholders, dismissal of that suit because of a vote by the
shareholders could only occur if there was an unbundled vote that was
preceded by preparation of an extensive report supporting such
dismissal. This conclusion appears to be driven by the distinction made
above between shareholder approval of the fairness of a transaction
and the more complicated situation involving shareholder evaluation
of a suit for misconduct. The latter certainly requires a richer process,
reflected in the ALI requirement that shareholder approval in those
situations occur in a truly independent and fully informed procedure.
Much of corporate doctrine takes its cues from Delaware. And
until recently, Delaware has not been much help to sister states on the
question of bundling; indeed, students of Delaware jurisprudence have
witnessed something of a ping-pong match among colliding jurists.177
Though many Delaware decisions touch upon the topic of
ratification,178 fewer cases consider whether bundling erodes the
efficacy of shareholder approval. In Corwin, its most recent
pronouncement on bundling, the Delaware Supreme Court crisply
stated “this Court has never held that the stockholders had to be asked
separately to ‘‘‘ratify’ the board’s actions for” their approval to invoke
the business judgment rule.179 Just a few years earlier, the same court
in Gantler v. Stephens180 reached a very different result, observing that:
[T]he scope of the shareholder ratification doctrine must be limited
to its so-called “classic” form; that is, to circumstances where a fully
informed shareholder vote approves director action that does not

177. For over three decades, Delaware case law regarding the doctrine of shareholder
ratification has been marred by “confusion.” See J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder
Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1443, 1445 (2014) (explaining that
Delaware courts had undergone an effort “to clarify confusion inadvertently created by loose
language about stockholder ratification in Smith v. Van Gorkom”).
178. See, e.g., Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1384 (Del. 1996); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d
75, 84 (Del. 1992); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v.
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 736–38 (Del.
Ch. 1999).
179. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 311 n.24 (Del. 2015).
180. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
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legally require shareholder approval in order to become legally
effective. Moreover, the only director action or conduct that can be
ratified is that which the shareholders are specifically asked to
approve.181

Gantler was responsive to reasoning used by the Delaware
Supreme Court in In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder
Litigation,182 which itself reversed a Delaware Court of Chancery
decision authored by then-Vice Chancellor Jack Jacobs, the
subsequent author Gantler.183 In In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp.
Shareholder Litigation,184 the plaintiff alleged that the board of
directors breached its duty of care by failing to disclose all material
facts connected to the merger and breached its Revlon and Unocal
duties by quashing the Union Pacific deal.185 The Court of Chancery
held the fully informed, uncoerced shareholder approval automatically
extinguished all claims against directors.186 The Delaware Supreme
Court reversed, holding:
In voting to approve the Santa Fe-Burlington merger, the Santa Fe
stockholders were not asked to ratify the Board’s unilateral decision
to erect defensive measures against the Union Pacific offer. The
stockholders were merely offered a choice between the Burlington
Merger and doing nothing. The Santa Fe stockholders did not vote in
favor of the precise measures under challenge . . . . Since the
stockholders of Santa Fe merely voted in favor of the merger and not

181. Id. at 713.
182. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).
183. See id. at 62–63 (reversing in part the decision of the Delaware Chancery Court). In
Gantler, First Nile’s board determined that the corporation should “put itself up for sale.” 965
A.2d at 700. First Nile’s management team, on the other hand, encouraged the board to abandon
its search, proposing instead a privatization plan. Id. Nevertheless, the board continued to identify
bidders, two of whom offered First Nile shareholders a premium over market price. Id.
Management, however, took actions to obstruct these bidders from moving forward with the
process and instead developed a privatization proposal intended to benefit incumbent board
members. Id. at 700–01. While one lone board member dissented, the rest of the board voted in
favor of the proposal, which required shareholder approval of an amendment to move forward.
Id. at 702. Just 50.28 percent of disinterested shareholders voted in favor of the proposal. Id. at
703. This is an example of management winning the “close ones.” See Listokin, supra note 28.
184. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 13587, 1995 WL 334258 (Del. Ch. May 31,
1995), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).
185. Id. at *5.
186. Id. at *8 (“Under Delaware law, a fully informed shareholder vote ratifies a challenged
transaction and operates to extinguish any claim that the directors breached their fiduciary duty
of care in connection with that transaction.”).
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the defensive measures, we decline to find ratification in this
instance.187

By holding that the vote approving the merger could not also ratify
director misconduct, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the probundling facet of then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs’s decision in the Court
of Chancery.
Delaware’s current embrace of bundling was achieved as a result
of distinguishing Gantler and Santa Fe Pacific as cases not involving full
disclosure, a factor not emphasized in either of those decisions.188 More
sweeping is that Delaware jurisprudence has lurched forward in allied
fronts so that the presence of a disinterested shareholder approval of a
transaction invokes the business judgment rule in a wide range of self-

187. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp., 669 A.2d at 68.
188. Chief Justice Leo Strine, the author of the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in
Corwin, before his elevation to that court, boldly stated that he believed Gantler was wrongly
decided. He observed that:
In a merger where there is no controller and the disinterested electorate controls the
outcome from the get go, . . . it has long been my understanding of Delaware law, that
the approval of an uncoerced, disinterested electorate of a merger (including a sale)
would have the effect of invoking the business judgment rule standard of review. . . . It
may be that a vote in that context does not involve “pure ratification,” see Gantler v.
Stephens . . . but I have long understood that under our law it would invoke the business
judgment rule standard of review.
In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 793 n.113 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(citation omitted). Strine’s opinions, throughout his career as a vice chancellor, chancellor, and
Chief Justice, are remarkably consistent in his acceptance of the cleansing effect of a bundled
vote. However, we believe his opinions in the wake of Gantler and before his own opinion in
Corwin reflect an excessively dismissive view of antibundling precedent. See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR
Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015); In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch.
2013); In re S. Peru Copper Corp., 52 A.3d 761.
Throughout his long judicial career, Strine has been consistent in his embrace of bundling
so that even a statutorily compelled vote invokes the immunizing effects of the business judgment
rule if the vote is fully informed and not coerced. See In re S. Peru Copper Corp., 52 A.3d at 793–
94 (holding that even though the case involved a vote of a majority of the disinterested
shareholders following full disclosure, the vote did not invoke the business judgment rule in a
merger with its 63.08 percent holder; Chancellor Strine reasoned that the approval was
meaningless because the merger required only two-thirds approval so that the minority
shareholders likely did not believe their vote would be meaningful); In re PNB Holding Co.
S’holders Litig., No. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999, at *15 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006) (explaining that had
the cash-out merger been approved by a majority of disinterested shares, the ratification would
have cleansed the transaction); In re Gen. Motors Class H S’holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 621 (Del.
Ch. 1999) (reasoning that stockholders’ choice to approve an amendment of the articles of
incorporation “carried with it a concomitant obligation on the part of the voters to accept
responsibility for the outcome” and therefore was not coercive and ratified any alleged
misconduct); Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 890 n.36 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating
that the shareholder approval of the merger accorded “burden-shifting ratification effect”).
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dealing settings.189 No recent Delaware Supreme Court decision
addresses the historic role of ratification as a concept involving
approval of the agent’s conduct and not the transaction that is the
product of that conduct.190
C. Federal Proxy Rules
Prior to 1992, proposals within proxy statements that were
disseminated to shareholders could be grouped together so long as the
proposals were “related.”191 However, in October of 1992, the SEC
altered the manner in which proxy resolutions are to be presented and
voted upon.192 Among the suite of reforms adopted was Securities
Exchange Act Rules 14a-4(a)(3) and (b)(1)—the “unbundling rules”—
which require proxy forms to “identify clearly and impartially each
separate matter intended to be acted upon”193 and to provide
shareholders with the “opportunity to specify by boxes a choice
between approval or disapproval of, or abstention with respect to each
189. See In re MFW, 67 A.3d at 499, 536, aff’d, Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635
(Del. 2014) (holding that a cash-out merger with a firm’s 43 percent owner enjoys the presumptive
validity of the business judgment rule when effected by a fully informed uncoerced vote of the
disinterested shareholders following negotiation and approval by a fully independent negotiating
committee); In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 424, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002) (holding
that the business judgment rule’s presumption applies when a controlling stockholder carries out
a short-form merger after obtaining, through a noncoercive tender offer, shares tendered by a
majority of the minority with disclosure that if the requisite 90 percent ownership is obtained via
the tender offer, the short-form merger will be consummated at a price equal to the tender offer
price).
190. In Lewis v. Vogelstein, Chancellor Allen qualified his ratification discussion by noting
that, because the stock-option plan could become effective without shareholder approval, the
principles he applied would not apply were the vote one required by statute: “I first note that by
shareholder ratification I do not refer to every instance in which shareholders vote affirmatively
with respect to a question placed before them. I exclude from the question those instances in
which shareholder votes are a necessary step in authorizing a transaction.” 699 A.2d 327, 334 (Del.
Ch. 1997). In an earlier decision, Braunschweiger v. American Home Shield Corp., No. 10755,
1991 WL 3920 (Del. Ch. Jan. 7, 1991), Chancellor Allen, in a transaction that required shareholder
approval, demurred whether a fully informed uncoerced vote would “constitute[] a defense to
plaintiffs’ claims of breach of fiduciary duty, or merely shift[] the burden to plaintiffs to prove the
unfairness of the transaction.” Id. at *7. In that case, because Chancellor Allen was able to avoid
resolving the bundling question because he found that the directors had failed to disclose all
material facts so that the shareholder approval had no effect, it is difficult to conclude whether
there was an evolution in his thinking on the propriety of bundling. See id.
191. Rule X-14A-2(a) of the Securities Exchange Act required that shareholders receive the
right to vote “on each matter, or each group of related matters as a whole.” Amended Proxy Rules,
3 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Aug. 13, 1938) (emphasis added).
192. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(3) (1993). The rules were proposed in Regulation of
Communications Among Securityholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (proposed July 2, 1992).
193. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(3) (emphasis added).
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separate matter referred to therein as intended to be acted upon, other
than elections to office.”194 Essentially, the unbundling rules require
that shareholders be able to vote separately on each matter set forth in
a proxy. These changes were made in an effort to improve
communication between shareholders, managers, and others soliciting
proxies and to remove unnecessary limitations on shareholders’
exercise of their voting rights.195
Although shareholders may now communicate their approval or
disapproval with respect to each matter on proxy forms to solicitors,
the implementation of these proposals is still allowed to be
“conditioned” on the approval of other proposals at the discretion of
managers.196 In their essence, the unbundling rules provide for greater
feedback between shareholders and proxy solicitors, but they do little
to shift control of the effectiveness of shareholder voting from
managers to shareholders. As illustrated by the Liberty Broadband
case, management can continue to provide a distorted choice to
shareholders by conditioning corporate action on shareholder
approval of two or more separately presented resolutions.197 This
outcome raises a couple of questions: Why would the SEC allow a form
of bundling by permitting companies to condition action on two or
more separate resolutions being approved? Moreover, does the SEC’s
position affect the deference to be given to any shareholder approval?
The SEC only obliquely suggests why its antibundling provisions
authorize managers to condition corporate action regarding one
resolution on the stockholders’ approval of another resolution; the
proposing release explains that this flexibility is guided by the fact that
“the legal effect of a matter approved by shareholders generally is a

194. Id. § 240.14a-4(b)(1).
195. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276, 48,276
(Oct. 22, 1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249), which states:
By removing unnecessary government interference in discussions among shareholders
of corporate performance and other matters of direct interest to all shareholders, these
rules should reduce the cost of regulation to both the government and to shareholders.
The amendments eliminate unnecessary regulatory obstacles to the exchange of views
and opinions by shareholders and others concerning management performance and
initiatives presented for a vote of shareholders. . . . The rules also remove unnecessary
limitations on shareholders’ use of their voting rights, and improve disclosure to
shareholders in the context of a solicitation as well as in the reporting of voting results.
196. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(3) (“Shall identify . . . each separate matter . . . whether or not
related to or conditioned on the approval of other matters . . . .” (emphasis added)).
197. See supra notes 160–67 and accompanying text.
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question of state law.”198 The SEC’s sensitivity to state law can easily
be understood since, at the time it proposed the antibundling rules, it
had recently suffered a then-rare rebuke in Business Roundtable v.
SEC199 to its rulemaking. Indeed, there was significant pushback
against the unbundling rules from corporate and legal commenters
based on the notion that the SEC was entering into areas of regulation
traditionally governed by state law.200 Just two years prior to the
unbundling regulations, the D.C. Circuit held that the SEC lacked
statutory authority to prohibit national security exchanges from listing
the stock of companies that violated new rules regulating the creation
of dual class shares in Business Roundtable. A major part of the court’s
reasoning was that governance and particularly voting were matters of
state law that were not swept within the enabling power of the SEC to
regulate proxies.201 Thus, in crafting the unbundling rules, it is likely
that the SEC was being increasingly cautious about exceeding the
limits of its authority in light of Business Roundtable.
On one hand, the unbundling rules may not go far enough in
attempting to right the imbalance of power between managers and
owners of publicly held corporations, which is greatly tilted in favor of
managers.202 On the other hand, the corporate and legal commenters
who pushed back against the efforts to curtail bundling claimed “there
is a “legitimate purpose in providing for a single vote on a group of
related matters.”203 In commentary to the final rule published in the
Federal Register, the SEC addressed the concern that the unbundling
rules could be “misleading” to shareholders who may mistakenly
believe they have a choice to accept some but not all of certain grouped
proposals.204 Certainly, this history cannot support bundling of the type
embraced by Corwin, which included two substantive matters within a
single resolution.

198. Regulation of Communications Among Securityholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 29,564, 29,566
(proposed July 2, 1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
199. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
200. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. at 48,287.
201. Id.
202. See James D. Cox, Fabrizio Ferri, Colleen Honigsberg & Randall S. Thomas, Quieting
the Shareholders’ Voice: Empirical Evidence of Pervasive Bundling in Proxy Solicitations, 89 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1175, 1183–87 (2016) (discussing the strategic advantage management holds over
shareholders in the corporate web).
203. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. at 48,287.
204. Id.
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D. Lurking Disclosure Considerations
The required scope and detail of disclosure of the possible
breaching behavior is undeveloped in Corwin. In transactions
regulated by the formal proxy rules of the Securities Exchange Act, a
good deal of information about the transaction must be disclosed. Even
in unregulated transactions, these requirements are something of a
template for proxy materials circulated among the shareholders.
However, the SEC guides do not address what additional information
must be disclosed when there are questions about whether the
directors or officers breached their fiduciary obligations in connection
with the transaction. For example, where Revlon duties are an issue, as
they were in Corwin, how much must the proxy statement disclose
regarding the steps directors took to assure they had pursued the best
offer for the firm? On this issue, a fairness opinion is not probative
because fairness is a range, not a point, unless the opinion opines the
offer submitted is at the very top echelon of the identified fairness
range. No doubt such opinions may be acquired, but this merely
introduces another concern, namely the independence of the
individuals responsible for the disclosures. Because fiduciary duties are
owed by the board, the attendant disclosures—and for that matter, the
processes followed for the transaction’s approval—cannot be viewed
as the product of an independent decisionmaker. This point is
particularly true in change-of-control situations such as Corwin. These
concerns place great stress on Corwin’s embrace of the curative effects
of shareholder approval. And even more stress arises when the
bundling itself introduces an unexamined likelihood that the vote is
coercive.205
The situation in Corwin itself is instructive on how problematic
disclosure is in such inquiries. KKR Financial Holdings (“KFH”) was
a limited liability company with its shares listed on the New York Stock
Exchange that was acquired by KKR, LP (“KKR”), a limited
partnership with its common units also listed on the New York Stock
Exchange.206 Both firms were formed in Delaware.207 KKR, through its
affiliates, provided management services for the conduct of KFH’s
business pursuant to a management contract that carried a $26,250,000
205. Note the lack of public enforcement on fiduciary duties by the SEC. See Santa Fe Indus.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977) (holding that absent deception, the antifraud provision of
the federal securities laws do not apply to breaches of fiduciary duty).
206. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 306 (Del. 2015).
207. Id. at 306 n.3.
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termination fee.208 Even though KKR and various affiliates held
substantial ownership interests in KFH, Corwin held KKR was not a
control person.209 Consequently, the enhanced scrutiny that Delaware
applies to “self-dealing” did not apply.210
The parties announced their agreement to the merger on
December 16, 2013, and their joint proxy statement was filed with the
SEC on March 24, 2014.211 Thus, three months of trading at the dealinfluenced price occurred before any disclosures through the proxy
statement were made regarding the KFH directors’ conduct. Nowhere
in the body of the 235-page proxy statement is there any suggestion, let
alone outright statement, that shareholders were asked to approve
anything other than the acquisition itself. In other words, the proxy
statement neither expressly nor implicitly informed the KFH
shareholders they were approving both the transaction and the
accompanying conduct of the KFH directors and KKR.212 To be sure,
at several locations within the proxy statement, disclosures were made
of the steps the directors took to act independently of KKR and to seek
a fair price for the firm.213 The proxy statement also described in detail
the relationships that had long existed between KKR and KFH214 and
disclosed how the KFH directors would benefit, through stock options
and phantom stock compensation plans, from the acquisition in ways
not shared by the KFH shareholders.215 Significantly, the proxy
statement observed that KFH’s independent negotiating committee
and its advisors “concluded that [the termination fee and other terms
of the agreement] made it highly unlikely that an acquisition of KFH
would be of interest to any person other than KKR.”216 However, in
repeatedly making these assertions, the proxy statement does not place
the termination fee in context; the total value of KFH per the parties’
final agreement is slightly in excess of $2.6 billion, meaning that the
termination fee is about 1 percent of the transaction’s value—a level
208. Id. at 306 (making reference to a termination fee; details regarding the fee appear in In
re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 986 (Del. Ch. 2014)).
209. Id. at 308.
210. Id.
211. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Mar. 24, 2014)
[hereinafter Schedule 14A].
212. Id.
213. Id. at 38 (“Fairness of the Merger”); id. at 91 (“Position of the KKR Participants as to
the Fairness of the Merger”).
214. Id. at 37–38 (“Certain Relationships between KKR and KFH.”).
215. Id. at 98 (“Interests of Directors and Executive Officers of KFH in the Merger.”).
216. Id. at 32.
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quite low by comparative termination-fee standards.217 The proxy
statement did disclose that KFH’s independent committee, through its
negotiating stance over a couple of weeks, did improve the price
ultimately paid by KKR—the exchange ratio increased in successive
offers from 0.46 KKR units to ultimately 0.51 units.218 Based on the
closing price as of the date of the proxy statement, the overall increase
was $1.17 per share.219 Finally, the proxy statement disclosed that
fifteen various shareholder suits had been promptly filed and, since
their filing, had been consolidated into one federal suit, one Delaware
suit, and one California suit.220 The statement only generally described
the nature of the claims.221 Complaints in the three surviving actions
were included in the proxy statement’s appendix.222
This sketch of KFH’s proxy statement shows that KFH
shareholders faced a significant challenge in extracting key voting
information from a 235-page document. In order to be fully informed,
shareholders needed to identify pockets of discrete facts in order to
formulate an understandable narrative about how the KFH directors
arrived at the ultimate exchange ratio of 0.51 KKR units for each KFH
share and to evaluate their acts against the multiple claims of selfdealing relationships and lack of independence. At no point in the body
of the proxy statement nor in its attachments was there any summary
of the law that applied to the KFH directors or, for that matter, to
KKR. Nor was there a single place in the proxy statement that collected
the points and counterpoints surrounding the parties’ conduct.
Furthermore, no guiding principles of law nor crisp presentation of
facts with opposing narratives of those facts were present in the
disclosure documents. Confounding the choice before the KFH
shareholders is the proxy statement’s clear language that the merger
was occurring at a time when KKR units were trading at a 52-week high

217. See id., Annex E, at 7. Because Delaware courts regularly accept breakup fees with a
much larger relative size, see MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 1291–92 (11th ed. unabr. 2014), the limits so accepted
can be seen as not reasonably discouraging third-party suitors. Also placing the termination fee
in perspective is that KFH’s investment bank garnered $17 million—65 percent of the termination
fee—for its fairness opinion and advice in connection with the acquisition. See Schedule 14A,
supra note 211, Annex E, at 2.
218. See Schedule 14A, supra note 211, at 32–35.
219. The KKR closing price March 20, 2014 was $23.46. Id. at 2.
220. Id. at 101–03.
221. Id.
222. Id. annex E, F & G.
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and KFH shares were at their 52-week low.223 It is therefore difficult
for voting shareholders to view the transaction other than being the
“bird in the hand” so that, given the uncertainty that pervades litigation
generally, the rational choice is to forgo litigation by approving the
acquisition.224
V. A THUMB ON THE SCALE: NEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE
EFFECT OF SHIFTS IN THE SHAREHOLDER PROFILE ON VOTING IN
M&A DEALS
This Part provides empirical evidence regarding the impact of
changes in shareholder ownership around merger announcements on
the likelihood of merger completion. In this Part, we find strong
empirical evidence that significant share-ownership transfers from
long-term to short-term institutional investors following the first
announcement that the firm is being acquired. This finding supports
the view that the new owners’ interests are the option value of the
consummated acquisition; as such, the new owners’ financial interest is
223. Id. at 41.
224. All of this highlights the importance to the plaintiffs of getting discovery about the
statements made in the defendants’ disclosures. From the defendants’ perspective, one of Corwin
and MFW’s greatest benefits is that they cut off initial discovery into the board’s actions related
to the transaction, reducing the plaintiff to reliance upon public information, or filing a § 220
action, if they wish to challenge the transaction. However, one does not need to look hard to find
pre-Corwin or -MFW cases where in the absence of discovery, significant managerial misconduct
would have gone unrevealed.
In re Del Monte Foods Co. Shareholders Litigation, 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011), is an
excellent example. In that case, the board of Del Monte Foods agreed to sell the company to a
consortium of private equity firms in what the company’s proxy statement portrayed as a
reasonably clean deal. See id. at 817. However, as the Court put it, “[d]iscovery revealed a deeper
problem.” Id. In fact, the plaintiffs uncovered facts that indicated the company’s investment
banker, Barclays Capital, had “secretly and selfishly manipulated the sale process to engineer a
transaction that would permit Barclays to obtain lucrative buy-side financing fees.” Id. After
substantial litigation, the plaintiffs obtained an $89.4 million judgment. See In re Del Monte Foods
Co. S’holder Litig., No. 6027-VCL, 2011 WL 6008590 (Del. Ch. Dec. 1, 2011) (order and final
judgment); In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holder Litig., No. 6027-VCL, 2011 WL 4802848 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 6, 2011) (stipulation and agreement of compromise and settlement).
Numerous other cases have been documented where “early access to discovery material
was essential.” Joel Edan Friedlander, Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty: Using Data Points of
Successful Stockholder Litigation as a Tool for Reform, 72 BUS. LAW. 623, 646 (2017). As
Friedlander wrote:
Expedited discovery can uncover e-mails that reveal facts that contradict or are not
disclosed in a proxy statement or board minutes. If such facts are uncovered in
expedited discovery, and if they are not corrected or disclosed in a supplement to the
proxy statement, then defendants cannot take advantage of the legal edifice built
around the significance of an informed stockholder vote.
Id. at 645.
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served by voting in favor of the acquisition and not voting against the
deal as a means to pursue claims of misconduct. Thus, in investigating
such ownership changes following deal announcements, we are
especially interested in movements of equity stock from long-term
owners, such as mutual funds, to short-term owners, such as merger
arbitrageurs, and the effect that these movements have on shareholder
voting on mergers.
To understand these effects, we must first explain the nature of
merger arbitrage. When a merger or takeover deal is announced, large
amounts of the target’s shares change hands as the original
shareholders of the target, now facing deal-completion risk, seek to
realize the gains in price of the target shares and avoid future market
and deal risks incident to that security.225 Other investors, called
merger arbitrageurs, play a pivotal role in fulfilling this risk-avoidance
strategy. The hedge funds and other short-term investors that pursue
merger arbitrage strategies, also known as risk arbitrage, buy target
companies’ stock after proposed mergers are announced and hold it
until deal completion in order to earn the spread between the deal
price and price after the transaction is announced.226 This spread
reflects the uncertainty that the deal will be successful or that it will
close under the original terms.227 If the deal were to fail, merger
arbitrageurs would take a loss given that the price would drop down to
preannouncement levels or lower. This incentivizes merger
arbitrageurs to be more friendly to target management and more
inclined to approve merger transactions.228 After all, the payoff to the
merger arbitrageur’s strategy relies on the deal’s success.
We are informed by experienced proxy solicitors that investors
who are selling their shares to the hedge funds before merger votes are
225. See Malcolm Baker & Serkan Savaşoglu, Limited Arbitrage in Mergers and Acquisitions,
64 J. FIN. ECON. 91, 92 (2002); Francesca Cornelli & David D. Li, Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers, 15
REV. FIN. STUD. 837, 837–38 (2002); Michael Demeter, Merger (Risk) Arbitrage Strategy, AIMA
CAN. STRATEGY PAPER SERIES, Oct. 2007, at 1, https://docplayer.net/20734417-Merger-riskarbitrage-strategy.html [https://perma.cc/RWH3-N3WL].
226. Demeter, supra note 225, at 1.
227. See id. at 1–2; Thomas E. Holber, Full of Hot Air? Evaluating the Airgas Court’s
Reservations About Shareholders’ Short-Term and Long-Term Interests in Takeovers, 18
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 123, 140 (2012); Aaron Brown, Opinion, The Reason Merger
Arbitrage Funds Aren’t Doing Well, BLOOMBERG (July 11, 2018, 1:00 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-07-11/merger-arbitrage-returns-are-suffering
[https://perma.cc/TSW5-TJZR].
228. See Cornelli & Li, supra note 225, at 859; Holber, supra note 227, at 140–41; Jim Hsieh
& Ralph A. Walkling, Determinants and Implications of Arbitrage Holdings in Acquisitions, 77 J.
FIN. ECON. 605, 608–09 (2005).
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often long-term holders in actively managed funds.229 Such long-term
holders are the parties that are most affected, for better or for worse,
by the actions of target management in structuring the proposed
transaction and negotiating the deal price. Once the deal is announced,
such long-term shareholders can choose to hold-and-vote or to sell.
Many actively managed long-term holders generally prefer to sell their
shares and capture the deal premium rather than to lobby against the
deal, even if they are dissatisfied with the actions of target
management. Investing, or remaining invested, in deal stocks involves
analyzing a significant number of variables that, while unfamiliar to a
typical long-term, active investor, are within the expertise of merger
arbitrageurs.
For our purposes, we wish to observe the frequency of such
ownership changes and assess the extent to which any observed shift in
stock ownership causes a change in the likelihood of the completion of
the merger. Logically, if a large block of stock moves out of the hands
of long-term investors and into the hands of short-term merger
arbitrageurs, then the likelihood of the merger being approved by
shareholders increases, even if the deal was the result of careless or
unfaithful target management actions. This is because merger
arbitrageurs will make money on deals that close and will lose money
on deals that do not. In this Part, we empirically study what kind of
deals attract merger arbitrageurs and what their effects are on merger
outcomes.
Specifically, we first measure the increase in ownership by shortterm investors, such as hedge funds and other arbitrageurs, from the
quarter before the deal’s announcement to the quarter after that
announcement. In line with merger arbitrage strategies, our empirical
results suggest short-term investors buy into target companies once an
announcement is made, replacing other medium- and long-term
investors. Second, we show that the likelihood of deal completion is
increased by this observed ownership change.
A. Methodology and Data
Our analysis relies on identifying short-term institutional investors
that engage in merger arbitrage, or similar short-term strategies, as well
as measuring the change in equity ownership during merger deals. Our
methodology consists of an empirically based characterization of
229. This paragraph is based on our confidential conversations with experienced proxy
solicitors.
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investors based on their portfolio horizons. That is, short-term
investors are defined as those institutions with high portfolio turnover,
while long-term investors are those with low turnover.230
1. Institutional Investor Turnover. The focus of our analysis is on
institutional investors’ ownership. In general, an institutional
investment manager is an entity that invests in securities for its own
account or an entity that exercises investment discretion over the
account of another.231 Institutional investment managers can include
banks, insurance companies, pension funds, investment managers,
hedge funds, and corporations, among others.232 Using data on equity
holdings of institutional investors from public filings with the SEC
required by § 13(f) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, we calculate
institutional investors’ annualized portfolio turnover.233 Portfolio
turnover is compounded from the quarterly turnover rates, which are
calculated as the lesser of purchases and sales divided by the investor’s
portfolio size. Hence, it measures the proportion of the portfolio that
is changed within a year, and the inverse can be used as a proxy for
investor horizon.
Table 1 shows sample statistics for portfolio turnover and equity
holdings by institutional investor type. Columns 1 and 2 show the mean
portfolio turnover and standard deviation to describe, on average, how
often investors change their portfolios and how varied the turnover
might be within an investor class, respectively. As expected, hedge
funds have the highest turnover—the shortest time horizon for holding
230. Some scholars have related empirical definitions focusing on merger arbitrageurs rather
than a larger set of short-term investors. See, e.g., Baker & Savaşoglu, supra note 225, at 108; Jan
Jindra & Ralph A. Walkling, Speculation Spreads and the Market Pricing of Proposed
Acquisitions, 10 J. CORP. FIN. 495, 497 (2004). An alternative characterization is to use a de jure
classification of institutional investor type. Indeed, as we will show, hedge funds tend to have the
shortest investment horizons. However, simply relying on type classifications can be problematic,
since some asset management firms, such as GAMCO, might employ merger arbitrage or other
active strategies in their portfolio management, while others take a more passive approach.
GAMCO Investors, formerly known as Gabelli Asset Management Company, is a well-known
investment fund that engages in a broad variety of investment strategies, including merger
arbitrage. See GABELLI FUNDS, https://www.gabelli.com [https://perma.cc/M2PP-2ZMT].
231. Form 13F-Reports Filed by Institutional Investment Managers, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-form13fhtm.html
[https://perma.cc/9QK6-DQR4].
232. We rely on Vikas Agarwal, Vyacheslav Fos & Wei Jiang, Inferring Reporting-Related
Biases in Hedge Fund Databases from Hedge Fund Equity Holdings, 59 MGMT. SCI. 1271 (2013),
for a classification of institutional investors into the various types listed in infra Table 1.
233. For a description of the method utilized to calculate institutional investors’ annualized
portfolio turnover, see Agarwal, Fos & Jiang, supra note 232, at 1277 & n.14.
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stock—while traditional buy-and-hold investors234 have the lowest
turnover. Asset management firms and mutual funds have average
holding horizons but relatively high variance due to the large fund
heterogeneity among these institutional investors. Column 3 shows the
largest institutional investors by total assets under management
(“AUM”) in equities. The two largest types are mutual funds and asset
managers, which have a mixture of passive and active portfolios and
investments. Among the top five largest investor classes are hedge
funds, which account for 10 percent of total AUM. Hedge funds also
rank second amongst the most numerous investor categories, after
asset management firms, as shown in Column 4. Finally, Column 5
shows that on average, hedge funds have one of the lowest number of
equity positions per investor, which means they are amongst the least
diversified types of institutional investors. This observation is
consistent with the view that most hedge funds specialize in specific
strategies or segments of the equity market so they tend to keep
concentrated positions. On the other hand, pension funds and mutual
funds rank as the most diversified investors.
Table 1: Portfolio Turnover by Investor Type235
This Table reports statistics on annualized portfolio turnover rates by
investor type. Column 1 and 2 report mean and standard deviation of the
portfolio turnover statistic. Column 3 shows the total AUM in equities of
each investor type. Column 4 shows the average number of institutional
investors for each investor type, and Column 5 reports the number of equity
positions or investments per investor. The sample is from 2000 to 2015.
Turnover
Total AUM Avg. # of
Avg. # of
Mean SD
($bn)
Investors
Positions
Hedge Funds
1.64 1.35
1,009.24
648.25
118.09
IB and Brokerage
0.74 0.73
373.94
52.81
552.64
Asset Management
0.62 0.69
2,574.61
1,266.57
153.19
Mutual Funds
0.49 0.38
2,777.46
95.31
504.55
Fin. Arms of Corps
0.47 0.45
42.61
12.69
195.24
Other
0.43 0.69
56.32
42.87
149.93
Insurance
0.42 0.26
467.97
71.43
386.31

234. Buy-and-hold refers to the investment strategy of buying stocks and holding them for a
long time with relatively little trading. In general, endowments, pension funds, insurance
companies and passive asset managers or mutual funds follow this strategy to some degree.
235. Turnover calculation methodology and institutional investor classification are as
described in Agarwal, Fos & Jiang, supra note 232.
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Banks and Trusts
Endowments
Pension Funds

0.31
0.29
0.26

0.19
0.31
0.24

1,987.23
36.91
321.44

206.25
21.12
31.19

435.62
111.7
779.02

2. Data on Merger Deals. Our data on merger announcements and
characteristics are from the Securities Data Company (“SDC”)
database.236 We limited our data to merger deals where the acquirer
must garner a majority support from the target shareholders to acquire
100 percent of the shares in the target firm. Therefore, we only use
mergers and acquisitions where the target firm is incorporated in the
United States, where the acquirer’s existing stake does not exceed 50
percent of the target firm and where data on all deal characteristics is
available. We match the sample with the Center for Research in
Securities Prices (“CRSP”)237 stock-price data and COMPUSTAT238
obtained from firms’ 10Qs and other quarterly financial filings. Finally,
we limit the sample to firms with more than fifty institutional
shareholders and deals with a value greater than $10 million to avoid
large changes in ownership from a shift in a small number of
investors.239 In total, the full sample includes 852 merger deals from
2000 to 2015.
3. Summary Statistics. Table 2 presents summary statistics of firm
characteristics for targeted firms in the sample. Firm characteristics are
lagged one-quarter to avoid endogeneity due to the merger
announcement and merger arbitrageur activity.240 We first include

236. SDC Platinum Financial Securities Data, REFINITIV SEC. DATA CO. (SDC),
https://www.refinitiv.com/en/products/sdc-platinum-financial-securities [https://perma.cc/ADC8V54E].
237. CTR. FOR RES. SEC. PRICES (CRSP), http://www.crsp.com [https://perma.cc/4QRGEL5H].
238. CompuStat® Data from S&P Global Market Intelligence, S&P GLOBAL (Oct. 2017),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/documents/compustat-brochure_digital.pdf
[https://perma.cc/796L-7DKW].
239. Without a threshold, there are some small firms that have large changes in ownership
that are not related to merger arbitrage. Results are robust to other thresholds, such as $50 million
or $100 million.
240. In very small target firms with few institutional shareholders, small and possibly
unrelated changes in institutional holdings can lead to large changes in short-term ownership that
do not reflect merger arbitrage activity. This filter improves the performance of our measure of
merger arbitrage but does not qualitatively change results.
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market capitalization (“Mkt Value”)241 as our measure of size and
book-to-market price (“B/M”)242 as a measure of the growth
opportunities of the firm. Both these variables might be correlated with
changes in shareholder composition because they correlate with
growth opportunities and likely determine the merger or takeover
interest in a target firm. The variable “Leverage,” representing the
indebtedness of the target firm, is defined as the ratio of debt-to-book
equity. “LnVol” is the logarithm of trading volume as a share of
outstanding shares and measures the liquidity of the target firm’s
stock.243 Liquidity can help explain the cross-sectional variation in
merger arbitrageur activity because informed investors can more easily
hide their trades.244 We add the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”),
which proxies for the degree of industry concentration and therefore is
likely to increase regulatory and antitrust risk.245 This is likely to be
correlated with the risk of deal noncompletion for strategic mergers.
We also include “Revenue Growth,”246 which measures past firm
performance reflected in the company’s income statement. However,
this does not necessarily reflect future performance since it is not a
forward-looking measure. Therefore, we add “Stk Ret,” the past
twelve-month stock return relative to the firm’s industry, which
represents the stockholders’ forward-looking expectations for the
firms relative to the industry average. The last variable shown in Table
2 is the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors relative

241. Market value, or market capitalization, is the total value of shares outstanding as priced
in the market. See Denys Glushkov, Market-to-Book (M/B) Ratio, WHARTON U. PA. (Sept. 2011),
https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/support/applications/risk-and-valuation-measures/
market-book-mb-ratio [https://perma.cc/H8KF-JEJF].
242. Book-to-market is the book value of equity as represented in the balance sheet divided
by the market value of outstanding equity. A large book-to-market ratio suggests a company has
limited growth opportunities, while a smaller ratio suggests the opposite. See id.
243. Volume traded is the total quantity of shares traded on a given day. Logarithm of volume
as a share of outstanding shares is a measure of the percentage of trades relative to the number
of shares available in the market. Pagano discusses the links between traded volume and asset
liquidity. See generally Marco Pagano, Trading Volume and Asset Liquidity, 104 Q.J. ECON. 255
(1989).
244. Cornelli & Li, supra note 225, at 839, 858.
245. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) is a measure of industry concentration. It is
calculated by taking the sum of the market shares squared for all firms in an industry. Stephen A.
Rhoades, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 79 FED. RES. BULL. 188, 188–89 (1993).
246. Revenue growth is an important determinant of merger activity since it is
likely correlated with valuation but is a function of firm history. Alex Edmans, Itay Goldstein &
Wei Jiang, The Real Effects of Financial Markets: The Impact of Prices on Takeovers, 67 J. FIN.
933, 946–48 (2012).

COX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/21/2019 4:50 PM

2019] THE (IR)RELEVANCE OF SHAREHOLDER VOTES 563
to shares outstanding.247 The remaining shares are owned by retail
investors. On average, 66 percent of the shares in target firms are
owned by institutional investors. Not only do institutional investors
hold a large share of issued stocks, but they also tend to vote more
frequently than retail investors.248 This means that changes in
ownership among institutional investors will likely matter more for
corporate governance issues.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
This Table reports summary statistics on the main firm-level variables. Data is
obtained from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. The sample is from 2000 to 2015.
Variables

Mkt Value ($M)

Percentiles
Mean

SD

5%

25%

50%

75%

95%

1,614.42

5,228.71

12.32

61.59

229.15

1,009.21

6853.64

B/M

0.72

0.69

0.09

0.34

0.57

0.9

1.93

Leverage

3.52

4.91

0.15

0.51

1.29

4.28

13.45

Ln(Vol)

-0.31

1.24

-2.48

-1.16

-0.2

0.6

1.56

HHI

0.08

0.08

0.02

0.04

0.05

0.09

0.21

Rev Growth

0.12

0.48

-0.33

-0.05

0.05

0.18

0.67

Stk Ret

-0.04

1.04

-0.8

-0.35

-0.11

0.14

0.71

Inst. Ownership

0.66

0.20

0.31

0.53

0.67

0.79

0.96

Although the existence of merger arbitrageurs is well known, our
first step is to quantify the target firm’s shareholder composition
changes around takeover announcements. Table 3 shows summary
statistics for the change in institutional investor composition as a share
of all institutional investors for target firms. Panel A shows the change
from the quarter preceding the merger announcement, “Q-1,” to the
first quarter ending after the announcement, “Q.” This measure
247. The ratio of institutional investors’ dollar holdings to market value represents the
amount of stock held by institutional investors versus retail investors. See id. at 950.
248. See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li & James Pinnington, Picking Friends Before Picking
(Proxy) Fights: How Mutual Fund Voting Shapes Proxy Contests 2 (ECGI Working Paper Series
in Fin., Working Paper No. 601/2019, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3101473 [https://perma.cc/Q3X9-QNZ6] (“The general apathy of retail investors in
engaging in voting matters implies that it is crucial that dissidents obtain the support of a majority
of the institutional shareholders of the targeted firms.”); ProxyPulse, 2018 Mini-Season Wrap-Up
and 2019 Trends, BROADRIDGE FIN. SOLUTIONS (2019), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/
pdf/broadridge-proxy-pulse-preview-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QPC-WML7].
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captures the change in shareholders for a relatively small window
around the merger announcement.249 Using our measure of portfolio
turnover, we classify investors as short-term (turnover greater than 1),
medium-term (turnover between 0.33 and 1), or long-term (less than
0.33).250 The key takeaway from Panel A is that short-term ownership
increases on average by a noticeable 11.22 percentage points (of total
institutional ownership) in the immediate quarter. Moreover, this
change in ownership does not anticipate but rather takes place only
after the announcement reflecting risk arbitrageurs in action.251 This
evidence points to a large participation of short-term, merger
arbitrageur investors that buy shares after mergers are announced but
not before, as they do not try to anticipate mergers. Panel A also shows
that hedge funds tend to be short-term investors that engage in these
arbitrage strategies, while asset managers and mutual funds, which are
medium- or longer-term investors, tend to reduce their positions.
Interestingly, the longest-term investors, such as pension funds or
endowments, do not seem to alter their ownership relative to other
institutional investors. This means that these very few long-term
investors are likely to remain as shareholders and vote on the merger.
Panel B in Table 3 shows the change in ownership from the
quarter preceding the merger announcement, “Q-1,” to the last quarter
in the merger “Q+T,” where “T” is the duration of the merger from
announcement to conclusion. In this larger event window, the increase
in short-term investor ownership is 13.19 percentage points, which is
slightly larger than in Panel A. This means that merger arbitrageurs
maintain, and even increase, their positions through the mergerapproval process. The fact that the merger-end change tends to be
larger than the one-quarter change speaks to slow-moving capital in
some investors as it may take them time to move between positions and
choose where to invest. Nevertheless, most merger arbitrage investors
likely buy shares soon after the announcement. There is evidence
(untabulated) of this speediness in the significant increase in short249. This is the tightest window we can use since 13(f) ownership data is reported on a
quarterly basis. See Form 13F-Reports Filed by Institutional Investment Managers, supra note 231.
250. The inverse of portfolio turnover is a proxy for the portfolio horizon, so short-term
investors have investment horizons below one year, medium-term investors have horizons
between one and three years, and finally, long-term investors have horizons greater than three
years.
251. Our data suggests that the change in ownership does not happen before the merger is
announced because there is no change in ownership in the quarter preceding the announcement,
while it is just as large as in Table 3 when the merger is announced only a few days after the Q-1
quarter-end.
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term ownership in the subsample of mergers announced a day before
Q, the immediate quarter-end when investors report their equity
holdings. This indicates that our measure of change in short-term
ownership does in fact identify merger arbitrage activity.
B. Determinants of Arbitrageur Participation
Although on average there is a large change in short-term
ownership before voting, some deals seem to attract more arbitrageurs
than others. Are arbitrageurs mainly present in reasonably riskless and
transparent deals that are unlikely to be challenged? If so, changes in
ownership may not be as problematic under Corwin, since these deals
are unlikely to face further equity-holder damage claims. However, the
Corwin decision would be problematic if arbitrageurs target risky deals
as well. To address this question we next explore the determinants for
merger arbitrage activity.
Table 3: Change in Shareholder Composition
This Table reports the change in institutional investor composition around merger
announcements. Shareholder composition is measured as a percentage (%) of all
institutional investors. Panel A compares ownership measures from 13(f) filings in
the preceding quarter Q-1 to those in the quarter Q immediately following the
announcement. Panel B compares ownership in the preceding quarter Q-1 to those
at the end of the merger Q+T, whether completed or withdrawn. We classify
investors as short-term if turnover is greater than 1, medium-term if between 0.33
and 1, and long-term if lower than 0.33. Final sample contains 852 mergers from
2000 to 2015 with at least 50 institutional investors.
Change in Shareholder Composition
(% of Institutional Investor Ownership)
Category
Mean
SD
Min
0.25
0.75
Max
Panel A:
One Quarter Change:
Q-1 to Q
Short-Term
11.22
9.95
-14.23
4.15
17.51
50.44
Med.-Term
-8.08
10.10
-45.66
-13.80
-1.69
31.92
Long-Term
-3.14
8.06
-37.57
-6.98
1.81
30.17
Hedge Funds
9.82
10.17
-33.72
2.90
15.79
58.31
IB and
Brokerage
1.14
3.22
-26.48
-0.26
2.39
25.38
Asset
Management
-5.97
8.17
-50.73
-10.10
-0.81
17.50
Mutual Funds
-4.19
6.78
-34.29
-7.68
-0.01
31.95
Fin. Arms of
Corps
-0.02
0.26
-4.78
-0.01
0.00
3.35
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Pension
Funds
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0.15

0.78

-5.27

-0.01

0.16

10.80

-0.79

2.07

-16.36

-1.16

0.09

10.16

-0.59
0.22

4.45
1.24

-20.01
-2.70

-2.60
0.00

1.78
0.07

28.58
26.38

0.25

1.39

-12.07

-0.36

0.79

6.40

11.16
11.49
9.13
11.21

-17.32
-56.17
-51.38
-33.93

5.24
-16.86
-8.69
4.33

20.61
-2.22
1.72
18.30

50.44
23.71
30.29
58.31

3.71

-26.48

-0.28

2.77

32.38

8.86
7.71

-58.90
-39.05

-11.56
-9.47

-1.64
-0.07

18.07
29.89

0.43
0.85

-4.53
-6.39

-0.04
-0.03

0.01
0.20

1.38
10.80

2.30

-16.36

-1.50

0.06

10.16

5.15
0.68

-29.84
-1.95

-2.96
0.00

1.92
0.12

28.58
7.07

1.47

-12.09

-0.49

0.78

5.70

Panel B:
Merger End Change:
Q-1 to Q+T
Short-Term
13.50
Med.-Term
-9.63
Long-Term
-3.87
Hedge Funds
11.96
IB and
Brokerage
1.41
Asset
Management
-7.20
Mutual Funds
-5.03
Fin. Arms of
Corps
-0.06
Other
0.15
Insurance
Companies
-1.01
Banks and
Trusts
-0.70
Endowments
0.16
Pension
Funds
0.18

In general terms, a merger arbitrageur’s objective is to capture the
risk premium—the spread between the bid price and the
postannouncement market stock price—while minimizing the risk of a
costly failing merger. Similar to other insurance markets, the risk that
the merger will not succeed is reflected in the spread—the difference
between the market price at which the security is purchased and the
ultimate payment received when the deal is consummated—which is
the compensation paid to arbitrageurs for taking on the noncompletion
risk. As a classic risk–return proposition, merger arbitrageurs may
avoid deals with certain characteristics as the risks associated with the
expected payout at a deal’s conclusions are too great for the rewards
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of undertaking the arbitrage transaction.252 Table 4 sets forth several
variables that impact the arbitrageurs’ assessment of the risks posed by
merger transactions
Table 4: Short-Term Ownership Changes and Deal Characteristics
This Table reports the change in short-term ownership and spread conditioning on
several merger characteristics. Spread is calculated as the percentage increase in the bid
price over the target’s stock price one day after the announcement. “Duration” is the
number of quarters the merger process takes from announcement to conclusion;
“Outcome” is either a successful merger with shareholder approval or a withdrawn
proposal; “Consideration” is separated into cash, shares, and other types; Management
Buyout (“MBO”) are mergers where management participated as the acquiring party;
“Competing Bids” represents mergers with competing bids; “Attitude” describes
whether the merger is hostile or friendly; finally, “Appraisal” indicates if an appraisal
was petitioned. Both the One-Quarter change and End-Date change are with respect to
the pre-announcement quarter. “Diff” columns show the difference in coefficients along
with the statistical significance of a t-test. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
are indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.
Category

Outcome
Completed

No.
Deals

in ST Ownership
(% of Institutional Investor Ownership)
One-Quarter
End-Date
Change
Change
Diff
Diff

773

11.64

—
5.52***

13.86

Spread (%)
Change

Diff

6.14

—

9.97

—
3.88***

10.87

4.73***

—
2.05***
3.17***

12.55

—

7.07

—

13.57

1.02
3.09***

5.80

-1.26

6.85

-0.21

14.95

4.73

—

9.03

—
5.91***

11.42

6.69***

Withdrawn
Duration
1

79

7.12

388

12.55

2

303

9.59

3 or more
Consideration
Cash

161

9.37

431

12.6

176

7.39

—
4.83***

15.63

Shares
Hybrid /
Other

245

11.53

-0.44

14.16

-0.78

6.36

1.63*

Self-Dealing
Transaction
No
Yes

668
184

11.59
9.88

—
-1.71**

13.96
11.84

—
-2.12**

7.01
4.69

—
-2.4**

252. John Paulson, The “Risk” in Risk Arbitrage, in MANAGING HEDGE FUND RISK: FROM
THE SEAT OF THE PRACTITIONER – VIEWS FROM INVESTORS, COUNTERPARTIES, HEDGE FUNDS
AND CONSULTANTS 189, 190–98 (Virginia

Reynolds Parker ed., 2000).
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834
18

11.32
6.64

—
-4.68**

13.52
12.31

—
-1.21

6.93
7.75

—
0.823

793
59

11.17
11.93

—
0.66

13.38
15.09

—
1.71

6.18
11.96

—
5.77***

849
3

11.23
7.62

—
-3.61

13.49
14.17

—
0.68

6.50
29.84

—
23.34***

835
17

11.23
10.62

—
-0.61

13.50
13.31

—
-0.19

6.66
3.01

—
-3.64

Table 4 shows related mean statistics for short-term ownership
changes conditioned on various deal characteristics and outcomes. The
last column of the table also shows the average bid spread, defined as
the percentage increase of the bid price from market price before the
announcement. We see that overall the average percentage of deal
completion is 91 percent in our sample. Several other very interesting
results merit discussion.
First, on average, the change in short-term ownership is greater in
successful deals—11.64 percent for one quarter; 13.69 percent for enddate—than in withdrawn ones—7.12 percent for one quarter; 9.97
percent for end-date. This speaks to the ability of hedge funds to
distinguish between deals as well as to the possible impact that
arbitrageurs have on merger outcomes. Additionally, the spread is
significantly lower for successful deals—6.14 percent for successful
deals versus 10.87 percent for unsuccessful ones—implying that riskier
deals are in fact priced as such. Secondly, we see that longer deals tend
to attract fewer arbitrageurs right after the deal is announced as shown
by the one-quarter change—12.55 percent for short deals against 9.37
percent for longer ones—but short-term investors significantly
increase their ownership as time goes by or as the merger nears
completion, increasing from 9.37 percent in the one-quarter change to
15.63 percent by end-date.
Other conditioning variables are deal characteristics. Both selfdealing transactions253 and management buyouts are known to pose

253. A self-dealing transaction is defined as a deal where the acquirer has a toehold greater
than 5 percent in the target or the company is to be taken private.
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higher risks of management wrongdoing,254 and these seem to have
smaller increases in short-term investors. These results are consistent
with the idea that merger arbitrageurs are not willing to take on this
type of high risk, especially given the lack of reward in higher spreads.
The fact that the short-term investors identified are reluctant to hold
shares of firms in self-dealing mergers with low spreads is further
indication that they are merger arbitrageurs, and not appraisal
arbitrageurs, because the latter group seeks to make profits by
litigating over possible conflicts of interest while the former seeks to
profit from the price spread.
The type of consideration received upon a deal’s conclusion is
another important determinant of arbitrage activity. Arbitrageurs face
an additional risk in noncash mergers because stock lacks a fixed
consideration value, and the merger arbitrageurs cannot ensure a
positive spread profit between the postannouncement buy-in date and
the time of completion.255 If the stock market were to perform poorly
during the merger process, they could lose money even if the merger
was successful.256 Table 4 reflects that this risk implies a larger increase
of short-term ownership as well as lower spread for cash deals. Finally,
Table 4 also presents statistics on deals with multiple competing bids
and merger attitude—that is, whether the deal is hostile or friendly.
Competing bids can result in larger bid premia and bid improvements.
Merger arbitrage is not the only strategy hedge funds can employ
during mergers. Some hedge funds have recently engaged in appraisal
arbitrage, whereby they target mergers with possible conflicts of
interest to petition an appraisal and possibly litigate.257 Clearly, an
appraisal-arbitrage strategy would have significantly different effects
on corporate outcomes since their strategy consists of voting against
the merger. The last conditioning variable in Table 4 is whether a fund
petitioned for an appraisal of the fair value of the shares. As Table 4
shows, there are relatively few appraisal-arbitrage cases in our
sample—twenty-eight, to be exact—and appraisal does not appear to
be correlated with a statistically significant larger increase in shortterm ownership. This implies that the changes in short-term ownership
254. Wei Jiang, Tao Li, Danqing Mei & Randall Thomas, Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy or
Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J.L. & ECON. 697, 699 & n.2 (2016).
255. Paulson, supra note 252, at 195.
256. For this reason, in stock deals, it is common for arbitrageurs to also short the acquirer’s
stock and lock in a spread. However, this is not a possible strategy for every merger arbitrageur
and poses other risks. See id. at 191.
257. Jiang et al., supra note 254, at 698.
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identified in our sample are more consistent with merger arbitrage
rather than with appraisal arbitrage. In fact, that short-term investors
are reluctant to hold shares of firms in self-dealing mergers with low
spreads is an indication that they are merger arbitrageurs, and not
appraisal arbitrageurs, because the latter group seeks to make profits
by litigating over possible conflicts of interest while the former seeks
to profit from the price spread.
Although the mean statistics in Table 4 speak to several different
results, they do not consider possible correlations between firm, deal
characteristics, and short-term ownership changes. To study
determinants for the change in ownership around merger
announcement and address this concern, we need to regress ownership
changes on these variables. Through use of regression techniques, we
seek to understand in which cases we should expect higher arbitrageur
participation, as this would highlight when other investors choose to
sell-out and not to vote on the merger. On the one hand, if merger
arbitrageurs offer insurance against possible deal breakdowns and
large downfalls in prices, then we should expect larger changes in
ownership around risky deals and those with higher bid premia over
previous market prices. On the other hand, arbitrageurs may also avoid
deals with poor prospects if they are unlikely to succeed and will shy
away from having to participate as activists engaging in managermonitoring behavior.
Table 5 shows estimates for regressions of the change in
institutional ownership on a variety of independent variables, including
the target firm’s characteristics and deal characteristics. The dependent
variable in the first three columns is the one-quarter change in
ownership, while in the last three columns it is the change to the last
quarter of the merger.258 Among the firm characteristics, market
capitalization is an important determinant in the first quarter of the
deal possibly because it is easier to coordinate strategies with other
short-term investors at larger firms.
Deal characteristics appear to be important determinants of
merger arbitrage activity. Our results suggest that self-dealing
transactions, and to a lesser extent management buy-outs, discourage
short-term investors from holding target stocks during mergers. This
result is somewhat puzzling, given that these types of mergers involve
a higher risk of failure, but the greater risk is not matched by a larger
258. Additionally, all regressions include year fixed effects to account for varying market
conditions and other time effects.
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spread as shown in Table 4. The type of consideration to effect the
merger is another important determinant of arbitrage activity. Cash
deals are associated with increases in short-term ownership relative to
stock and hybrid deals.
Finally, the offer premium, defined as the spread between the
offered merger price and the pre-announcement market price, is also
an important determinant. An increase of one percentage point in the
offer premium is associated with a five-basis-point increase in shortterm investor ownership.
Table 5: Determinants of Change in Stock Ownership
This Table reports estimates from regressing changes in ownership composition as a
percentage of institutional investors on firm and deal characteristics. The dependent
variables in the first three columns are one-quarter changes (“Q-1 to QI”) for short-term
(“ST”), medium-term (“MT”) and long-term (“LT”) investors, respectively. In the last
three columns, it is merger-end changes (“Q-1 to Q+T”) for short-term (“ST”), mediumterm (“MT”) and long-term (“LT”) investors. The target firm characteristics are market
capitalization (“MV”), book-to-market (“B/M”), leverage ratio, dividend yield, revenue
growth, past year stock market growth relative to industry average, the logarithm of
traded volume, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”).
Dep.
Variable

in Ownership (% of Institutional Investors)
Q-1 to Q

Q-1 to End of Merger

ST

MT

MV

-0.752***

0.747***

0.00563

-0.304

0.676**

-0.372

(-2.94)

(2.88)

(0.02)

(-1.01)

(2.22)

(-1.45)

B/M

-2.139**

1.444

0.695

-2.261**

1.849*

0.412

(-2.46)

(1.62)

(0.88)

(-2.47)

(1.85)

(0.50)

0.0493

0.0414

-0.0907

0.133

0.0294

-0.163*

(0.59)

(0.47)

(-1.17)

(1.56)

(0.30)

(-1.89)

Leverage
Div. Yield
Rev. Growth
Past Stk
Return

LT

ST

MT

LT

-8.336**

3.803

4.533

-11.15**

7.073

4.075

(-2.10)

(0.87)

(1.08)

(-2.58)

(1.40)

(1.03)

-0.0255

-0.0485

0.0740

-0.196

0.128

0.0675

(-0.04)

(-0.06)

(0.15)

(-0.24)

(0.13)

(0.13)

0.277

0.278

-0.555***

0.323

0.105

-0.428**

(1.05)

(1.26)

(-3.25)

(0.96)

(0.36)

(-2.04)

Volume

0.686

-2.009***

1.324***

0.556

-2.103***

1.547***

(1.54)

(-4.66)

(3.54)

(1.13)

(-4.18)

(3.68)

HHI

1.162

-0.418

-0.744

-0.183

-1.009

1.191
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(0.28)

(-0.10)

(-0.23)

(-0.04)

-2.666***

3.127***

-0.461

-3.533***

3.406***

0.127

(-2.81)

(3.28)

(-0.63)

(-3.44)

(3.28)

(0.16)

-3.690*

3.048

0.642

0.511

-0.381

-0.130

(-1.80)

(1.56)

(0.48)

(0.21)

(-0.16)

(-0.08)

Hostile

-7.007**

3.744

3.263*

-3.612

2.038

1.574

(-2.27)

(1.27)

(1.94)

(-0.57)

(0.45)

(0.61)

Cash

2.211***

-2.485***

0.274

2.782***

-2.877***

0.0943

(2.72)

(-3.04)

(0.43)

(3.01)

(-3.11)

(0.13)

1.710

-1.158

-0.552

2.937*

-1.995

-0.942

(1.21)

(-0.87)

(-0.52)

(1.73)

(-1.18)

(-0.79)

5.374***

-3.412**

-1.962

5.657***

-2.756

-2.901**

(3.43)

(-2.27)

(-1.60)

(3.20)

(-1.52)

(-2.09)

Self-Dealing
MBO

Competing
Bids
Bid
Premium
Constant

(-0.21)

(0.30)

9.201***

-9.261***

0.0601

8.296***

-11.79***

3.499

(3.76)

(-3.46)

(0.03)

(2.77)

(-3.60)

(1.42)

R-squared

0.130

0.132

0.136

0.107

0.124

0.142

Observations

852

852

852

852

852

852

C. Effects on Merger Outcomes
Large ownership shifts pose a problem under Corwin because,
ultimately, voting does not reflect the same deal-approval preference
to that of the original shareholders. Since merger arbitrageurs can be
expected to vote in favor of deals in light of their substantial investment
being riveted to the value of the end-of-deal consideration, the large
shift in ownership we observe can be decisive in determining the
outcome of a deal. Moreover, since high share turnover is observable
and signals merger arbitrage activity, other investors may feel this
thumb on the scale and decide to support the deal rather than vote
against it.
What is the projected effect of these ownership shifts on the
likelihood of merger completion? In Table 6, we set forth data that
enables us to assess the impact of changes in institutional ownership
during M&A events and merger outcomes. Specifically, we present
evidence that merger arbitrageur activity is associated with a higher
likelihood for merger success in deals where shareholder approval is
decisive.
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Table 6: Merger Outcomes
This Table reports estimates of a probit model for merger success. In both
regressions, the dependent variable is 1 if the merger was successful and 0
otherwise. The variable of interest in the first regression is the change in short-term
ownership (“ ST”). The second regression uses a Top 20% to indicate if ST is in
the top quintile, and a Bottom 20% dummy to indicate if ST is in the bottom
quintile. The “dPr/dX” columns show the marginal effects on merger success
probability of a unit change (or 100 basis points) in each regressor.
Dep. Variable:

Success=1
Probit

ST (%)

0.0268***

Success=1

dPr/dX

Probit

dPr/dX

0.30%

(3.61)
Top 20%

0.648**

Bottom 20%

-0.0794

2.48%

(2.51)
-5.32%

(-0.50)
Spread (%)

-0.870**

-0.11%

(-2.45)
MV

0.0912*
0.0713

1.02%

-0.00850

0.80%

0.0813

-0.10%

-0.00818

-0.632
-0.323***

-7.10%

0.00880

-3.63%

-0.0671

0.10%

-1.039
(-1.56)

-9.13%

-0.326***

-3.68%

0.00826

0.09%

(0.19)
-0.75%

(-0.73)
HHI

-0.809

(-2.84)

(0.20)
Volume

-0.09%

(-0.98)

(-2.76)
Past Stk
Return

0.92%

(-0.48)

(-0.79)
Rev. Growth

1.03%

(0.43)

(-0.51)
Div. Yield

0.0916*
(1.74)

(0.39)
Leverage

-0.09%

(-2.28)

(1.74)
B/M

-0.820**

-0.0880

-0.99%

(-0.94)
-11.67%

-1.109
(-1.63)

12.52%
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-0.424**

-4.76%

(-2.11)
MBO

-0.210

-0.793

-2.36%

0.176

-8.91%

Constant
R-squared
Observations

-1.714***

-3.44%

-0.954

10.76%

(-1.50)
1.98%

(1.04)
Competing
Bids

-0.305
(-0.75)

(-1.26)
Cash

-4.89%

(-2.14)

(-0.52)
Hostile

-0.433**

0.188

2.12%

(1.09)
-19.25%

-1.721***

(-7.96)

(-7.88)

1.078**

1.182**

(2.27)

(2.46)

0.258

0.254

839

839

19.42%

Unlike the sample used in previous tables, this analysis excludes
mergers that failed on regulatory grounds. Merger deals are usually
subject to regulatory approval intended to prevent anticompetitive
transactions, but such reviews can lead to deal failures regardless of
shareholder composition or investor support.259 In fact, out of seventynine failures in our original sample, we identify ten regulatory failures
that correspond with an increase in short-term ownership that was 6.7
percentage points lower than in other failures. It would be imprudent
to claim that these ten deals failed because of less arbitrage activity.
Table 6 shows estimates of a probit model of merger success
likelihood, highlighting the importance of shareholder changes.260 The
main variable of interest is the one-quarter change in short-term
ownership (“ ST”), which captures the amount of merger arbitrage
participation, while the remaining variables are covariates that can also
affect success likelihood. In the first regression, the coefficient on ST
shows evidence of the importance of merger arbitrage and the second
column presents the marginal effects (“dPr/dx”), which allows us to
259. Data on regulatory failures were provided by Morgan Ricks (Vanderbilt Law School).
260. Probit regressions estimate binary dependent variables models, such as merger success,
by fitting a gaussian cumulative distribution. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC
ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 457–59 (2002) for an in-depth description of
probit and other binary response models.
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interpret the economic significance of our results. We previously
showed in Table 4 that 91 percent of the deals in our sample were
successfully completed—in line with previous estimates of the
unconditional average probability of success.261 And in Panel B of
Table 3, we showed that the average one-quarter change in short-term
ownership is 11.2 percentage points. In terms of the marginal effects, a
one-percentage-point increase in short-term ownership is associated
with a 0.30 percentage-point increase in merger success from an
unconditional average probability of 91 percent. Thus, if we
extrapolate linearly then the average merger arbitrage activity changes
merger likelihood by 3.4 percent (0.30 x 11.2 percent), which can be
interpreted to mean that increased merger arbitrage has a statistically
significant positive effect on deal completion. As an additional
example, a deal without any increase in short-term ownership
(“ ST=0”) corresponds with a 87.6 percent likelihood of completion,262
while a deal with a 10 percentage point—one standard deviation—
higher-than-average arbitrageur participation corresponds with a 94
percent likelihood of completion. In other words, the risk of deal
noncompletion drops from 12.4 percent to 6 percent, or by over 50
percent, when short-term ownership increases this much.
There are two different interpretations for the relationship
between deal success and increases in short-term ownership. The first
suggests arbitrageurs might simply consider the riskiness of deals and
avoid those most likely to fail. However, this regression includes the
postannouncement spread—the deal price over stock market price—
as well as deal and firm characteristics, to control for possible sources
of risk that may correlate with arbitrage activity. In fact, as expected, a
higher spread does predict a higher likelihood of failure, confirming
that arbitrageurs demand a higher compensation to buy shares in
riskier deals. But most importantly, by controlling for these variables,
the coefficient on the change in short-term ownership is not capturing
risks that arbitrageurs price-in. Rather, we interpret this result as
evidence in favor of the second interpretation: that short-term
investors push for the deal’s completion by voting in favor of the
transaction.263

261. Hsieh & Walkling, supra note 228, at 618–19.
262. The likelihood of completion without any increase in short-term ownership is calculated
as follows: 91 – (0.30 x 11.2) = 87.6.
263. Hsieh and Walkling reach a similar conclusion in their study. Cf. Hsieh & Walkling, supra
note 228, at 642.
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In addition, we shed light on a few other results on the relationship
between deal characteristics and merger outcomes. For instance, selfdealing transactions lower the likelihood of deal success as these
transactions are more often challenged by other stakeholders.
Consideration also seems to matter: cash deals have a higher likelihood
of merger completion. Of course, if a deal is challenged by a competing
bid, then subsequent bids are generally higher and more frequent.
Tautologically, then, if there are competing bids, the likelihood that
any one deal is successful is lower.
To examine more closely the impact of the shift of shares into
short-term holders’ hands, we next examine those transactions with the
highest and the lowest percentage changes in stock ownership. For
example, when we look at the twenty deals with the greatest shifts, we
find that they show a percentage shift to short-term investors ranging
from approximately 40 percent to over 50 percent of all shares held by
institutional investors. Not surprisingly, all of these twenty transactions
obtained shareholder approval.
To get a more sophisticated view of these effects, in the second
regression of Table 6 we break out the cases with the highest twenty
percentage shifts (“Top 20%”) and the lowest twenty percentage shifts
(“Bottom 20%”) and then rerun the regression in Table 6. By
examining the coefficients of these two variables, we should be able to
discern the impact on merger success of high and low shifts in shortterm investor holdings.
The signs on the coefficients of both variables confirm our result,
but only the Top 20 percent coefficient is statistically significant. It can
be interpreted as evidence that in those mergers with large changes in
shares from long-term holders into the hands of merger arbitrageurs,
the risk of merger failure is higher by 2.8 percentage points than the
average merger, whereas for the Bottom 20 percent there is an
insignificant decrease of 2.7 percentage points relative to the average
success rate.
While these overall percentage changes appear relatively small, it
is important to remember Listokin’s findings that “management wins
the close ones.”264 As we saw in Table 6, the percentage shift out of the
hands of long-term holders and into those of short-term merger
arbitrageurs has important effects on merger completion rates. Even

264. Listokin, supra note 28.
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small percentage shifts will enable corporate managers to push through
shareholder votes to gain merger approvals.
VI. RECONSIDERING SELF-DEALING TRANSACTIONS
The data and analysis in the preceding Part challenge a key
mechanism corporate law has long embraced for addressing one of the
most prevalent issues that arise in corporations: self-dealing
transactions. In its most basic form, self-dealing arises when directors,
officers, or controlling stockholders directly or indirectly enter into
contracts or transactions with a corporation in which they serve as a
director, officer, or controlling shareholder.265 All states now have
conflict-of-interest statutes that address contracts or transactions in
which a corporation’s director or officer has such an interest.266 Even
beyond the state conflict of interest statutes, control stockholder selfdealing, although not the subject of such statutes, follows an analogous
course to that provided by statute for director and officer selfdealing.267
In broad overview, self-dealing by any fiduciary results in that
person having the burden of establishing the contract or transaction’s
fairness. This inquiry generally focuses on whether the deal bears the
indicia of an arms-length transaction, so reviewing courts consider the

265. “Self-dealing” as used here is narrower than “conflict of interest” or bad faith as selfdealing covers transactions in which the fiduciary is either in privity of contract with the
corporation or has a fiduciary or financial interest in an entity that is in privity with the
corporation. Thus, we do not intend the expression self-dealing to include the broader range of
duty of loyalty violations by officers or directors or for that matter oppressive or unfair behavior
by a controlling party. See, e.g., Kern v. Arlington Ridge Pathology, S.C., 893 N.E.2d 999, 1008
(Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (holding there to be no self-dealing involved when shareholder-directors vote
to amend the company’s articles of incorporation so that it provides greater flexibility for them to
later increase their control of the firm). See generally 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 2, §§ 10.11–.12
(distinguishing absence of good faith from self-dealing); Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors
Trustees?: Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966) (providing close
analysis of cases whereby in a few decades courts and legislatures moved from deeming selfdealing transactions voidable to upholding transactions if they were fair or impartially approved).
266. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2018);
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 2019); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60–.63 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2016).
267. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994)
(“[A]pproval of the transaction by an independent committee of directors or an informed
majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness from the
controlling or dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff.”).
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price as compared to market value,268 the level of disclosure
surrounding the matter,269 and whether the transaction was the product
of negotiations by independent parties.270 The breadth of such a
fairness inquiry, when coupled with the fact that the conflicted party
has the burden of proof, is daunting, and all the more so if there is also
fear that this inquiry may be plagued by hindsight bias.271 Statutory
provisions and common law doctrine have created two alternatives to
the blunderbuss fairness inquiry: good-faith independent ratification
by either independent directors or the disinterested shareholders.272
When such impartial approval occurs, courts regularly conclude that
the adverse inference that arose solely because of the demonstrated
self-dealing by the director, officer, or controlling stockholder
disappears, such that the contract thereafter is viewed as any other
business transaction arrived at in good faith and at arm’s length.273 That
is, independent-director or shareholder approval restores the
presumption of the business judgment rule so that anyone questioning

268. See, e.g., Kim v. Grover C. Coors Tr., 179 P.3d 86, 92 (Colo. App. 2007); Johnson v.
Witkowski, 573 N.E.2d 513, 521–22 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); Straight v. Goss, 678 S.E.2d 443, 452–
54 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009).
269. See, e.g., Kim, 179 P.3d at 93–94; Dynan v. Fritz, 508 N.E.2d 1371, 1378 (Mass. 1987);
State ex rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 391 P.2d 979, 984 (Wash. 1964) (equating
nondisclosure with inherent unfairness).
270. See, e.g., Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445 (Del. 1991) (emphasizing lengthy bargaining,
transaction priced at midpoint of each party’s position, and absence of viable alternatives).
271. For a discussion of how hindsight bias impacts the content of fiduciary duties in the
corporate setting, see EISENBERG & COX, supra note 217, at 625–27 (explaining how more than
ordinary negligence is required for breach of care in corporate setting out of concern that
hindsight bias otherwise may impose liability for justifiable risk taking by managers; however,
with loyalty violations, such as self-dealing, second guessing in light of post-transaction events
remains a possibility).
272. There is an academic debate over whether these measures are necessary or value
maximizing. See generally Alessio M. Pacces, Procedural and Substantive Review of Related Party
Transactions: The Case for Noncontrolling Shareholder-Dependent Directors, in THE LAW AND
FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS, supra note 25, at 181 (arguing that minorityelected directors are the most efficient method of monitoring value decreasing related party
transactions); Rock, supra note 25 (arguing that majority of minority votes do not greatly harm
nor greatly benefit minority shareholders); Fernán Restrepo, Judicial Deference, Procedural
Protections, and Deal Outcomes in Freezeout Transactions: Evidence of the Effect of MFW (Mar.
5, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3105169 [https://perma.cc/PH6NJSZA] (arguing that the MFW legal standard provides a net benefit to minority shareholders in
squeezeout transactions).
273. See, e.g., Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1266 (Conn. 1994); Lewis v.
Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997).
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that transaction has the burden of proof that the approving parties
acted in bad faith or were grossly negligent.274
We do not believe that the empirical evidence and reasons
developed above necessarily cause the contemporary approach to selfdealing to be reconsidered; they do call for clarification of what such
approval does not mean, at least with respect to state conflict-ofinterest statutes. As first developed, state conflict-of-interest statutes
sought to change prevailing judicial avoidance of contracts or
transactions when there was evidence that the contract directly or
indirectly involved a director or officer. By the time the first conflictof-interest statute was enacted, the modern cases had already moved
beyond automatic avoidance and upheld deals if they were shown to
be fair and independently approved. Initially, conflict-of-interest
statutes embraced this modern approach, but generally, they were not
regulatory. In the intervening decades, a good deal of uncertainty
surrounds just what effect should be accorded impartial director or
shareholder approval.275
This Article strongly counsels that courts should not be indifferent
to whether self-dealing was approved by the directors or the
shareholders because the individual contexts behind these decisions
are vastly unique. Of the two, the directors are, on paper, in the better
position to protect the corporate interest when addressing self-dealing.
Among the advantages that the board enjoys is better access to
information and capabilities to evaluate information. This advantage
exists for three main reasons. First, board members are the
quintessential insiders with knowledge of information not readily
available to the general public. Second, the board does not have the
collective action problems that shareholders do; directors not only
engage easily among themselves, but also, more importantly, they are
better able to deliberate about the transaction with greater depth than
shareholders, who have no means to probe more deeply than the proxy
statement. Finally, directors enjoy the power of the purse as they can

274. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 875 F.2d 549, 552–53 (6th
Cir. 1989); Rosenfield, 643 A.2d at 1266.
275. See Douglas M. Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts To Curtail the Fiduciary
Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 385–90 (1988)
(closely reviewing the 1988 amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act that effectively
removed from any scrutiny transactions that are independently approved); Marsh, supra note 265
(providing the classic discussion of how the common law’s early approach to conflict of interest
quickly morphed from automatic avoidance of self-dealing transactions to inquiries into the
challenged transaction’s fairness).
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deploy corporate funds to retain advisors and others to enable them to
make a truly informed decision.
As seen earlier, many shares are held by financial institutions, who
can have their own conflicts of interest that influence their ratification
decision and who, importantly, face no fiduciary obligation when
voting that serves to regulate any conflict they have. By contrast,
directors, whose vote can serve as a ratifying vote as a threshold matter,
are independent of the underlying contract or transaction and are
subject to fiduciary obligations in their review and approval of the selfdealing transaction. Independent directors, when asked to approve a
self-dealing transaction, do not face a bird-in-the-hand situation of the
type discussed in the Introduction, which appears to dwarf the
heuristics that guide even sophisticated hedge funds in supporting a
majority of the minority votes in self-dealing mergers. Shareholders
can naturally understand that withholding approval means no
transaction, whereas the independent directors generally enjoy the
position to negotiate a better outcome. That freedom also disconnects
the underlying self-dealing conduct from the contract or transaction;
that is, a self-dealing contract or transaction submitted to the board of
directors is not bundled in the same way that resolutions presented to
the shareholders might be. Because the boardroom is a forum for
deliberation, it allows boards to withhold approval while negotiating
for improved terms. Further leverage exists for the board, as it is able
to qualify its approval with an articulation that it is only authorizing the
contract or transaction and not necessarily affirming the fiduciary’s
conduct.
The above are a few of the reasons why approval by the board of
directors and the shareholders, in light of the data and analysis
developed in this paper, should be treated very differently. We do not
quibble with the contemporary view that a self-dealing transaction that
is the product of a fully informed impartial vote of the directors should
be reviewed differently than if that transaction had no impartial
approval. This seems supported by logic and is likely legislatively
compelled by state conflict-of-interest statutes, which provide three
separate alternative mechanisms for upholding self-dealing
transactions. First, a transaction could pass a fairness inquiry. Second,
the transaction could be approved by the impartial directors. Third, the
transaction could be approved by the shareholders. Importantly, the
latter two avenues do not have to pass the fairness requirement.
Impartial approval must have some benefit over a fairness inquiry.
How should the approval by the weaker impartial body—the
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shareholders—be treated differently from the approval by the board of
directors? The necessary predicates for shareholder approval to
cleanse a matter is that their approval must come after full disclosure
and not be coerced.276 Consistent with the operation of conflict-ofinterest statutes, the burden of proof for each of these should be on the
party who seeks to invoke the cleansing effect of the shareholder vote.
The analysis in this Article supports the view that at least in the case of
alleged ratification by the shareholders, the inquiry into each of these
predicate requirements should be more sweeping than it has been.
Even though the absence of coercion is the sine qua non for
shareholder approval, our analysis and data demonstrate that the
courts have been woefully narrow in what they hold to be coercion. As
discussed earlier, Liberty Broadband did hold that directly bundling
negative- and positive-value outcomes into connected resolutions
caused coercion, such that the shareholders’ ultimate approval did not
cleanse the misconduct. Our Article makes the case that shareholder
approval of merger transactions offering a premium of any amount
above the pre-announced market price is inherently coercive. This
explains why Professor Rock’s study of MOM transactions found no
instance in which shareholders withheld their approval.277 Our data in
Part V show that substantial ownership changes among institutional
investors occurs in the quarter the deal is announced, so that these new
owners are committed to approving the deal by the investment they
have already made. Thus, when the proxy statement later discloses
details indicating possible unfairness—or worse, management laxity or
conflicts—the vote by the arriving owners is hardly free of financial
duress. From our perspective, coercion should, at least in the case of
shareholder ratification, be much more sweeping than classic bundling
considerations.
Likewise, a court’s inquiry into whether material facts were
disclosed should be more inclusive than in the case of the board of
directors. As seen earlier, directors, whether on the full board or a
committee of the board, have a chance to interact with the transaction
and its supporters. Shareholders acting only through the proxy
mechanisms do not. This distinction implicates both what needs to be
disclosed and how the disclosed information is presented. Certainly
more than a neutral narrative of the transaction’s terms, such as
occurred in the proxy statement at the heart of Corwin, is needed.
276. See supra Part IV.A.
277. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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There is no easy template for what is to be disclosed and how disclosure
should be made. Perhaps instructively, in self-dealing transactions, the
defendant bears the burden of disclosing, in an understandable
manner, the facts necessary for the shareholder to excuse the selfdealing. Minimally, companies should be required to make a detailed
and balanced disclosure of the ways in which the conflicted parties
benefit from the transaction, presenting the potential legal and
financial arguments bearing on whether misconduct has occurred and
indicating whether the transaction is in the interest of the company or
its shareholders.
CONCLUSION
Corporate statutes condition significant corporate transactions on
shareholder approval. This is an important mechanism for protecting
shareholders. While we champion the voice of the shareholder in votes
and in corporate governance issues, for the reasons we develop in this
Article, we believe that the shareholder vote is deeply qualified. Thus,
at a time when ownership of public companies is increasingly
concentrated in financial institutions, providing a basis for courts and
commentators to call for curbing protective features of corporate law,
we caution judges and academics that the time is not yet at hand for
such a laissez faire approach. Shareholders, even large, well-financed
hedge funds, face too many forces that limit their ability to single out
managers for misconduct in a transaction that the shareholders are
asked to approve. As developed here, their voice in approving the
transaction, even one separately identified as involving self-dealing,
should be understood as only approving the transaction itself and not
the conduct that preceded it.

